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“Here as elsewhere, to pose the problem in terms of choice, to oblige or to 
believe oneself obliged to answer it by a yes or no, to conceive of 
appurtenance as an allegiance or nonappurtenance as plain speaking, is to 
confuse very different levels, paths and styles. In the deconstruction of the 
arche, one does not make a choice.” 
My italics - Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, p.62 
 
 
             
 
                “The work of art as world that gives birth only to itself…” 
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche- A fragment from the years 
1885-6. 
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                                                  ABSTRACT 
 
LANGUAGE, ORIGIN AND MIMESIS: A PARTICULAR READING OF    
  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORD AND IMAGE 
 
                                  Çağrı Barış Kasap 
                           M.F.A. in Graphic Design 
               Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Andreas Treske  
                                   December, 2004    
 
In the historical affinity of West, language has always been ‘erected’ as a 
construct of Idea (sign/presence/speech/logos). In this ‘logocentric teleology’ 
(Derrida), opposition between nature and institution, play of differences between 
symbol, sign, image etc. is a naïve conceptualization of representation, an uncritical 
opposition between sensible and intelligible, between soul and body proper and the 
diversity of sense functions.  By the creative links found among various authors such 
as Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Gilles Deleuze, Philippe Lacoue- Labarthe, 
Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Luc Nancy, through the inscription of the below-
mentioned keywords found in their numerous studies, this thesis is a theoretical 
survey of how the erection or the usage of language that has an absolute link with 
God’s logos that belongs to a particular history and time, can be deconstructed. As a 
prospect, it, further, will be promised that certain authors in the history of literature, 
who have been condemned according to their distance from the logos, instead of 
being rendered in passivity, can be studied by the pathway followed and developed 
by this thesis. 
 
Keywords: repetition, difference, immanence/ image of thought, image, mimesis, 
dialectical thinking (whole and fragment) 
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                                                  ÖZET 
 
 DİL, ORİJİN VE MİMESİS: İMGE VE KELİME ARSINDAKİ  
                                     İLİŞKİNİN  BİR OKUMASI    
   
                                           Çağrı Barış Kasap 
                                       Graphic Tasarım Bölümü 
                                               Yüksek Lisans 
                           Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Andreas Treske 
                                               December, 2004 
Batı metafizik tarihinde, dil her zaman İdea’ya (işaret, şimdilik, konuşma/ses, logos) 
yakınlığı doğrultusunda kurulmuştur. Bu “logos-merkezci inşa”da (terim Jacques 
Derrida’ya aittir), kurumsallaşma ve doğa arasındaki terslik, sembol, işaret ve imge 
arasındaki farkların oyunu, temsil’i (representation) her zaman uslaştırılabilen ve 
hisedilebilen arasında saf, kritik olmayan, ve sorgulanmayan bir kavramsallıştırma 
olarak konumlandırmıştır. Bu konu üzerinde daha önce çalışmış olan Walter 
Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Phillipe Lacoue-
Labarthe ve Jean-Luc Nancy gibi teorisyenlerin çeşitli çalışmaları arasında bulunan 
bağlantılar ile, bu tezde, logos’a yakınlığı doğrultusunda kurulan dilin, nasıl 
yapısöküme uğratılabildiğini ve bu dilin aslında belli bir tarihe ve zaman dilimine ait 
ve kısıtlı bir bakışa sahip olduğunu, üstte adı geçen teorisyenlerin çalışmalarına 
dayanılarak ortaya koyulmaya çalışılır.   
Anahtar Sözcükler: tekrar, fark, içkinlik/ düşünce imgesi, imge, temsil, diyalektik 
düşünce (bütün/parça)  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research Problem and A Note on Authorship 
 
The aim of this thesis is a survey and a strategic reading of the given keywords 
through various authors of critical theory. The problems of language due to what we 
understand of it, what we do when we manipulate its reality and its idea/image and its 
relation with its idea as its origin, will occupy the scope of this inquiry. The intention of 
a ‘subject’ behind the language, approximated to truth and presence in originarity, who 
is supposed to use it as managed by the traditional view on language and how some 
recent critical theorists had tried to ‘deconstruct’ this tradition will be pursued further. In 
the long history of language as the constructive element of literature, there have been 
various writers that have not been analyzed through the theoretical pathways that will be 
given in this thesis. The pathway that is prospected to be opened by this thesis without a 
distinction of depth and surface here is also the pathway that is exercised by these 
authors. It is announced by leaving a crack in the text in order to avoid the matrix of any 
onto-pheno-epistemo-logy. Although the scope of this thesis will not let them be 
analyzed either, it will ask for a lot of future analyses to be done through this pathway.   
The reason why this thesis itself is a gathering together of various authors’ 
theories by a reading through the keywords and not a thesis that is in the claim of the 
possession of its own truth content is in itself what this thesis is already trying to 
problematize in its archeological genealogy (in the Nietzscheian sense of the term). 
What has implied this strategy is not the hubris of the author of this thesis but on the 
very contrary, his very ‘non-stance’. Resonated in Derrida’s words; “Even before being 
determined as human (with all the distinctive characteristics that have always been 
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attributed to man and the entire system of significations that they imply) or nonhuman, 
the grammé –or the grapheme- would thus name the element. An element, whether it is 
understood as the medium or as the irreducible atom, of the arche-synthesis in general, 
of what one must forbid oneself to define within the system of oppositions of 
metaphysics, of what consequently one should not even call experience in general, that 
is to say the origin of meaning in general” (Derrida, Of Grammatology 9). The outcome 
effect of such a strategy of course had imposed to use long quotations. Another intention 
of this strategy has been to abandon the ‘presence’ of the author as much as possible, to 
be as objective as possible instead of a free ride with the object up until it would 
‘resemblance’ the author (subject). One should wonder with what other intention, Walter 
Benjamin would ever think of writing a book that was composed of just quotations and 
nothing more. In order words, ‘this’ author has not chosen to be the slave of what he has 
been doing. However, it, also should be given here that it is never a superfluous 
emphasis on ‘objectivity’ which still is implacable in a metaphysical systemization, to be 
planned carefully but never reached at its limit.  
The other main motive was inspired by Nietzsche and what he has written in his 
polemic against the long error of metaphysics in The Twilight of Idols: “the distinctive 
marks that have been considered as the real essence of things are the distinctive marks of 
non-being, of nothingness”. Caught up in laboriously constructing this nothingness, we 
do not notice that in the meantime language has become a planet of which we only see 
the dark side. And that the judgment we render upon it is nothing other than the logos, 
the reunion of the word and the thing that it stands for (which it only can ‘name’ as its 
‘shadow’ or should, in fact, name as its ‘phantom’ in Plato’s lexicon). Moreover, 
becoming aware of its shadow, language immediately receives its own negation in itself 
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and in order to bridge the gap that used to separate it from criticism, it itself becomes the 
logos of its names and its shadow. This is what we usually name as the ‘critical 
reflection’ on language. In the modern epoch of language starting from its first 
ontological determinations in Plato’s writings, it is the critical reflection that lays bare its 
own split, thus suppressing and rendering superfluous its own space.       
  
1.2. Introduction to the Conceptual Framework  
What appears to be the judgment of language – as that what we impose upon it to 
alienate it in its absolute otherness until it is caught and made familiar to our sameness - 
has led us to the radical alienation of language; even to the extent that ‘nature’ had been 
inscribed within this limit. Language has to turn into nature and nature has to be brought 
to the ‘mimesis’ of language as God’s ‘writing’. The attempt of the establishment of 
‘language of art’ is probably guiltier in that respect than every other language. The term 
‘writing’ belongs to Jacques Derrida; “For some time now, as a matter of fact, here and 
there, by a gesture and for motives that are profoundly necessary, whose degradation is 
easier to denounce than it is to disclose their origin, one says “language” for action, 
movement, thought, reflection, consciousness, unconsciousness, experience, affectivity 
etc. Now we tend to say “writing” for all that and more: to designate not only the 
physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription but also the totality of 
what makes it possible; and also, beyond the signifying face itself. And thus we say 
“writing” for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not 
even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of voice: cinematography, 
choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural “writing”” (original 
quotations – Of Grammatology 9).       
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1.3. Related Terms and Concepts  
To escape from the alienation of language, a number of keywords have been 
detected for the purposes of this study. ‘Immanence’ is the interiorization process of the 
subject as the user of the language. In the dialectical process which is always made 
‘immanent to something’ (the scope of which will be given by Deleuze), in order to 
establish the language, the subject, first of all, should alienate himself, keep its image (as 
that ‘something’) away to negate it, so that he can construct himself back. In the 
encounter that constructs this split of the subject, language always works for the identity 
construction. The ‘wholeness’ of language, that is its image, should be alienated from 
the subject in his ‘fragmentariness’ up until the fragment turns into an annihilation of the 
subject himself. The mediation of language with God’s word (logos) is what counts for 
this as Walter Benjamin will tell us. What accounts for dialectical thought is that any 
attempt against the demolishment of the ‘originality’ (grammer, signified face, sound-
pattern) should be relinquished. In fact, its ‘outside’ is not just an extra term but in many 
accounts, a necessary ground for its investigation, a model according to which 
everything else should be negated down in order to construct its own telos and identity 
as its inmost self. To experience the language, the subject must first ‘differ’ himself and 
learn to ‘repeat’ ceaselessly the content of the language. To assize the language as an 
idea in its totality is his task, to understand the voice of his own soul (‘phantom’ for 
Plato or ‘Absolute Spirit’ for Hegel) and hear himself speaking is his objective 
meditation in order to construct his identity. The subject’s identity is related to 
difference in three ways. It is opposed to difference in general, insofar as difference 
creates the disparity or exteriority of being-outside-the-self, or insofar as it posits that 
otherness with respect to which the identical pulls together from and upon it. Identity 
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while pulling itself together supposes and reabsorbs within itself the differences that 
constitute itself: both its difference form its other and its difference from itself in the 
movement of grasping itself. In this immanence to its other, identity makes difference. 
However, in the long error of philosophy to think in representations, Deleuze asserts that 
difference has always been thought as a quality whenever tamed in a symmetrical 
synthesis under the four iron collars of representation; ‘identity in the concept’, 
‘opposition in the predicate’, ‘analogy in judgment’ and ‘resemblance in perception’, in 
all of which the irreducible difference (singularity) of the disparate elements of the 
‘whole’ had always been tried to be excluded.  In order to construct the orgiastic and 
infinite moral vision of the world as the ‘image of thought’, repetition is also figured as a 
matter of explaining the possibility of differences without concept and therefore must be 
defined in relation to the absolute identity. Thus, when defined under and in relation to 
the same concept, it has always been represented as the repetition of the same. The 
repetition of the same has always been ‘represented’ and mimed in ‘time’ by 
differentiating itself in the ‘presence’ of the present, and calling the future, the past and 
the ‘present as such’ from its self-localization.    
If the subject cannot constitute its own identity through its use of language, in 
other words, if the identity cannot pass through the differentiation of the self, then as 
Hegel will tell us that he is forever to remain in a childish passivity. However, as Jean-
Luc Nancy remarks: 
“Passivity is not the state of an individuality constituted as identity. 
Passivity is individuality without identity, which is not the same as itself 
and cannot relate itself to itself. One can hardly say that a child is passive 
individuality: rather, it is individualized passivity, numerically detached 
as a distinct unity. But this unity “is” so to speak, only its detachment, 
only its being-detached; it is not yet even the same as itself, or it is so 
without entering into any relation with itself. Passive being is as much 
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being without difference as it is being completely different from itself, 
being disconnected in its being from its very being” (Nancy, The Birth to 
Presence 27).  
 
Therefore the passivity of such a being is not a property of quality, or a form or 
state. It is the property of the absence of property, but this absence is not a lack either for 
the subject to return to itself after the contemplation of that lack. Nancy defines this 
property as an “interior individuality of the affective being” (27). However, this 
interiority is not to be the subject’s own interiority and thus not exterior to itself. Its self 
(where that interiority is conditioned) is a subject that differs from itself but that 
difference is not internal to the subject. This difference in the subject is not the 
difference of the subject and so it imposes outside the subject what is properly the 
subject’s interior. “The subject does not have this difference: it is this difference – in 
such a way, however, that the subject is not thus its own, proper difference but is, rather, 
different from that of which it is properly the subject” (28). Thus understood, the 
intention, here is not to call or underline passivity, either. 
 There have been certain authors who have turned themselves or have never ‘been 
born into subjectivity’; out of time, they had been investigated as the affective passive 
beings in the history of literature - William Burroughs, Jean Genet, Friedrich Holderlin, 
Stéphane Mallarme, John Keats – to give a few names.  However, they are still cornered 
in a shelf of a library or scrutinized in traditional ways. Although the scope of this thesis 
will not let them be scrutinized either, hopefully by the theoretical path opened up by 
this thesis, it will further be promised that these studies could be developed.            
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1.4. Summary of the Chapters and the Prospect  
 
As a matter of consequence, where to start has also been another problem for this 
thesis. To construct one’s ‘plane of immanence’ in order to make one’s mind movement 
through an analytical methodology would always be the best way for academic 
purposes. However, as it has been shown by the referred authors of this thesis that mind, 
in fact, mind never works analytically, unless imposed from outside. Thus, in the first 
chapter of the study, Walter Benjamin’s two essays ‘On the Language as Such and On 
the Language of Man’ and ‘Mimetic Faculty’ have been chosen as the theoretical 
orientation centers of this thesis. In his article Benjamin ‘starts’ with the problem of 
language in two theoretical declinations. These two theories of the language (the 
bourgeois and theological), for Benjamin, puts ‘man’ in a magically mediated alienation 
where the expression of his mental life only communicates his being as a mental 
construct but can unfortunately communicate nothing else. Overburdened with the task 
of naming, received from God’s word (logos), man cannot cope or understand the 
language of music, sculpture etc., which are critical reflections in the constitution of 
nature. In the end, man is forever alienated from the nature as a topographic entity that 
should be constructed as an anti-thesis. However, man should also ‘understand’ nature, 
for he needs her reception; as much as he receives from her, he can construct such a 
language.  Since that already constituted immediate mediation that makes man forever 
thrown from nature is concluded in the great sadness and mourning of nature where she 
is mute because named by man. However, even in the creation story of the Bible as the 
originary reference of the representation of God’s word, given by Benjamin, in and 
through which nature’s placement is also inscribed, it will further be discussed in this 
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thesis that Benjamin can never leave his ideas about the origin presupposed, constituted 
either as a ‘whole’ and unity against which the rescue of man can be found in the 
‘fragment’. Another article of Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ gives 
numerous other clues on this problematic. In this article, Benjamin’s attempt is to 
discover microcosm through macrocosm (the fragment through the whole) and 
graphology as a ‘positive science of linguistics’ where the unconscious graft dropped on 
the paper by a person can be studied as an icon, a representation in the displacement of 
that person. Where the problematicity of Benjamin’s argument lies, for the scope of this 
thesis is, his understanding of the graft as a ‘similarity’, a ‘re/presentation’, as a 
‘mimesis’ of the exemplary person. In other words, Walter Benjamin has always 
remained as a dialectician of immanence, a thinker of representation, entrapped in his 
mimesis (perhaps).      
 In the second chapter, a ruptured reading of the concepts of difference and 
repetition has been given. The aim of this chapter is to orient us to talk about the 
unanalyzed language of the authors who are in the claim of neither differentiating nor 
repeating themselves (or better; repeating themselves without the Sameness of a model). 
Another reference both affecting and affected by Walter Benjamin is Theodor Adorno, 
who himself has been an author who problematizes the concepts of difference and 
repetition. The aspect of this chapter will be Adorno’s ‘dialectically problematic’ 
understanding of ‘difference and repetition’. The concepts ‘difference’ and ‘repetition’ 
as two of the keywords of this thesis will help us later on to open up a space of the 
theoretical possibility of talking about a language that ‘neither resembles itself nor its 
other as another language’; in other words, a language that neither repeats nor differs 
itself in the traditional sense.  
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Another significance of a reading of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory is to depict the 
exemplary attempt of how such languages of sculpture and music (of art, in general) can 
be employed and to where it might ever lead. Highly known to be the  dialectician of 
super-negation, Adorno maintains a peculiar concept of ‘becoming’ at the end of his 
Aesthetic Theory, but by the problematical stance of this ‘conceptualization’, it  will be  
shown that what Adorno, particularly, understands of ‘becoming’ inevitably falls back 
into the unconcealing or masking trap of dialectics. Moreover, it will be exposed that 
Adorno has never ‘thought’ of anything else than these points except the unthought in 
the thought, though rarefied, he has also, remained as a dialectician of metaphysics as 
much as Walter Benjamin, and has solely tried to employ an aesthetics that never breaks 
its links with the ‘sublime’ as idea/origin.  
Another work of Adorno, co-written with Horkheimer, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment has been given in this thesis, in order to lay out the problematic view of 
Adorno and Horkheimer on ‘difference’ and ‘repetition’. When the concepts of self-
sacrifice and self-preservation of the modern bourgeois individual that has been lend 
down to us by the enlightenment thought as Adorno and Horkheimer claim, are seen 
through Deleuze’s assertions on ‘difference’ and ‘repetition’, one will be able to see that 
the authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment (including their various other works) should be 
seeing the subject as subjected to difference and repetition strictly in mimesis. The 
individual bourgeois prototype characterized in the example of Homer’s Odysseus self-
sacrifices in order to self-preserve himself according to a model which is given in their 
limit in the ‘principle of equivalence’, ‘barter’, ‘cunning’ or in the duality of the 
emancipation claim of  enlightenment in opposition to the mythic world (the 
fundamental claims of both of which are in fact the same, as the authors try to show us), 
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the self-sacrifice which gives the endless and unbearable repetition of the self-
preservation under the concept of the principle of equivalence etc. Although, the endless 
repetition that always works to preserve the self is what the authors of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment complain about, the scope of Deleuze’s work will give the extension on 
how one can affectively and successfully repeat without the same concept or without the 
principle of equivalence that affix every value to the model of the Same, which always 
enjoys its tacit superiority.  
In the fourth and the last chapter, the erection of the word as image in relation to the 
model will be deconstructed. In fact, Jacques Derrida, as the most well-known 
theoretician has already laid this out. In his peculiar concept of ‘arche-writing’, Jacques 
Derrida, criticizes Ferdinand de Saussure’s ‘science of linguistics’ and asks for a science 
of grammatology (the legibility of which Derrida finds in de Saussure’s work) that does 
not work by negation as a positivist science. “Writing is that forgetting of the self, that 
exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, of the Erinnerung that opens 
the history of the spirit. It is this that the Phaedrus said: writing is at once 
mnemotechnique and the power of forgetting” (Derrida, Of Grammatology 24). Erupted 
as the ‘outside’ of the metaphysical tradition but as that which finds its roots in the 
model of that tradition as a ‘parasite’ (to use Derrida’s word), it will further be pursued 
in this thesis that the unanalyzed authors have lived in the uncanniness of this break of 
the word as image and their usage of language have always already become. Later on, as 
will further be given in Jean Luc-Nancy’s concepts of compearance and literary 
communism, these authors, has found their ‘others’ in themselves leading to shatter the 
sovereignty of the subjection and its presence and share the ‘origin’ (at-the-same-time-
and-the-same-place) and paralyzed as unable to speak (or not understanding-oneself-
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speak), have been breaching the play of articulations of words of language as images (in 
other words, as ‘names’). As has been stated by Jacques Derrida; 
 “From the moment that there is meaning there is nothing but signs. We 
think only in signs. Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign at the 
very moment when, as in Nietzsche, its exigency is recognized in the 
absoluteness of its right. Once could call play the absence of the 
transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as the 
destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence. It is not 
surprising that the shock, shaping and undermining metaphysics since its 
origin, lets itself be named as such in the period when, refusing to bind 
linguistics to semantics (which all European linguists, from Saussure to 
Hjemslev, still do), expelling the problem of meaning outside of their 
researchers, certain American linguists constantly refer to the model of a 
game. Here one must think of writing as a game within language. (The 
Phaedrus condemned writing precisely as play -paidia- and opposed such 
childishness to the adult gravity [spoudé] of speech). This play, thought 
as absence of the transcendental signified, is not a play in the world, as it 
has always been defined, for the purposes of containing it, by the 
philosophical tradition and as the theoreticians of play also consider it 
[…] To think play radically the ontological and transcendental 
problematic must first be seriously exhausted; the question of the 
meaning of being, the being of entity and of the transcendental origin of 
the world –of the world-ness of the world- must be patiently and 
rigorously worked through, the critical movement of the Husserlian and 
Heideggerian questions must be effectively followed to the very end, and 
their effectiveness and legibility must be conserved. Even if it were 
crossed out, without it the concepts of play […] will remain caught within 
regional limits and an empiricist, positivist or metaphysical discourse. 
The counter-move that the holders of such a discourse would oppose to 
the precritical tradition and to metaphysical speculation would be nothing 
but the wordly representation of their own operation. It is therefore the 
game of the world that must first be thought; before attempting to 
understand all the forms of the play in the world” (Derrida, Of 
Grammatology 50).  
 
In the game of this world, to not become the subjects as entities of their own 
utterances, away from the phono-centrics-logics of logos; these authors, displaced by the 
other that, perhaps, they had found in themselves has lived in the world of that literal 
community and who cannot be regarded as authors in the classical sense of the term. To 
repeat: although the scope of this thesis will not let those authors be scrutinized, I am 
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hoping in my future studies to pursue this aim. Therefore, this study has to be regarded 
as a pre-conception of this pathway.   
 
2. THE STAG/E/ING OF LANGUAGE: THE WORD AS EIDOS/IMAGE  
 
2.1. The Metaphysical Procedure: Idea as Erection, Fiction, Style and  
 
        Signature  
 
In his article, ‘On the language of Man and On the Language as Such’, Walter 
Benjamin enjoins himself with the possibility and question of talking about a language 
and its theoretical understanding and more specifically with the possibility of talking 
about “[…] a language of music and of sculpture, about a language of justice that has 
nothing to do with those in German or English legal judgments are couched, about a 
language of technology that is not the specialized language of technicians” (REAAW 
314).  
For Benjamin, every expression of human mental life can be understood as a 
kind of language. Language acts when it communicates the linguistic being of things. 
However, for Benjamin, all language communicates solely itself. Like in the example of 
the lamp as the lamp in expression, the lamp in communication, there is a language of 
the lamp which does not communicate the lamp but the mental being of the lamp. Since 
the linguistic being of all things is their language which can even be described in the 
capacity for communication. In the medium language, all language communicates itself 
in itself.  
For Walter Benjamin the mediation is the fundamental problem of linguistic 
theory, “[…] and if one chooses to call this immediacy magic, then the primary problem 
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of language is its magic.” (my underline - 316-7). At the same time, Benjamin finds 
another point in the magic of the language: its infinity.  
 
“For just because nothing is communicated through language, what is 
communicated through in language cannot be externally limited or 
measured, and therefore all language contains its own incommensurable, 
uniquely constituted infinity. Its linguistic being, not its verbal meanings, 
defines its frontier” (original italics - 317).  
 
In the realm of men, however, the linguistic being of men is their language. “Man 
communicates his own mental being in his language. […] However the language of man 
speaks in words. Men therefore communicates his own mental being (insofar as it is 
communicable) by naming all other things” (317) However, for Benjamin, it is not only 
man’s language that names things, but rather just that we know no other language than 
that of man that names things. Therefore, it is the linguistic being of man to name things. 
However, undermines the point:  
“To whom does man communicate himself? But is this question, as 
applied to man, other than as applied to other communications 
(languages)? To whom does the lamp communicate itself? The mountain? 
The fox? But here the answer is: to man. This is not anthropomorphism. 
The truth of this answer is shown in knowledge and perhaps also in art. 
Furthermore, if the lamp and the mountain and the fox did not 
communicate themselves to man, how should he be able to name them? 
And he names them: he communicates himself by naming them. To 
whom does he communicate himself?” (original italics- 317).   
 
To reveal the bourgeois conception of language, Benjamin undertakes the belief 
in 
the view that man communicates his mental being through his language, because 
language does not happen through the names of things, that is, through the words by 
which he denotes a thing. Since the linguistic being of the language of man is what 
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defines the frontier of the language and not its verbal meanings, Benjamin concludes 
that when the language of man is ever put into the process of communication, it is the 
factual subject matter that can be communicated. And again, this is what the bourgeois 
view is:  
 “And the advocate of such a view can only assume that man is          
communicating factual subject matter to other men, for that does happen 
through the word by which he denotes a thing.[…] The other conception 
of language, in contrast, knows no means, no object, and no addressee of 
communication. It means: in naming, the mental being of man 
communicates itself to God” (original italics - 318).  
 
Naming, as the sole basis of the language of man, communicates nothing, but 
only        itself and – absolutely. Through the absolute wholeness of the language, “only 
there is    the name, and only the name is there” (318). Through the difference and the 
comparison of human language where man is the namer and other languages, we 
recognize that through him pure language speaks. In Benjamin’s words: “Names as the 
heritage of human language therefore vouches for the fact that language as such is the 
mental being of man, alone among all mental entities, communicable without residue” 
(my underline - 318).  
    All nature communicates itself in language and so finally in man. Since God is 
the lord of nature and can give names to things, in this circular movement, the creation 
of God is completed; “when things receive their names from man, from whom in name 
can language alone speak” (319). To demonstrate this, by quoting from Bible Benjamin 
maintains that man deploys language, not as a means but as a ‘medium’ and thus, by 
calling the name as the absolute language, he speaks in name; “man is the speaker of 
language, and for this very reason its only speaker” (319).  
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Name, however, is not only the last utterance of language but also the true call of 
it. Thus in name appears the essential law of language, according to which to express 
oneself and address everything else amounts to the same. The mental entity of language 
only expresses itself purely where it speaks in name, that is, “in its universal naming” 
(319). Therefore, in name culminate both “the intensive totality of language, as the 
absolutely communicable mental entity” and “the extensive totality of language, as the 
universally communicating (naming) entity” (319). For this reason, the virtue of 
communicating the nature of language is also its universality, “language is incomplete 
where the mental entity that speaks from it is not in its whole structure linguistic, that is, 
communicable. Man alone has a language that complete both in its universality and in 
its intensiveness” (original italics -319).   
After having stated these salient points, Benjamin, now, asks a question without 
any further risk of confusion. Benjamin’s concern now resides with the mediation and 
meaning of language. Since the mental state of being is identical with the linguistic, 
“then, a thing, by virtue of its mental being, is a medium of communication, and what is 
communicated in it is – in accordance with its mediating relationship- precisely this 
medium (language) itself.” (320). Within this tautology, actually, Benjamin makes his 
point to invalidate the bourgeois conception of language; if the mental being of things is 
already communicable, then the linguistic being of things cannot be identical with the 
mental. “There is no such thing as a meaning of language: as communication, language 
communicates a mental entity, i.e., something communicable per se” (original italics - 
320). 
The differences between languages (those of man’s and other languages) then 
varies due to media distinguished by their density of the two spheres of communication; 
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naming (communicating) and name (communicable). And yet, these two spheres are 
clearly distinguished but united and are found constantly interrelated in the language of 
man. The equation between the mental being and the linguistic being is of great 
metaphysical importance to linguistic theory, for it always produces a central concept: 
‘the concept of revelation’, which always has waged a conflict between what is 
expressed and expressible and what is unexpressed and inexpressible. The more real and 
existent the mind, the more does it not let reveal the inexpressible. It also obscures the 
relation between mind and language. Its only formula is that the most rounded, definitive 
and therefore, the most existent entity (‘word’) is at the same time purely mental.    
“Exactly this, however, is meant by the concept of revelation, if it takes 
the inviolability of the word as the only and sufficient condition and 
characteristic of the divinity of the mental being that is expressed in it. 
The highest mental region of religion is (the concept of revelation) at the 
same time the only one that does not know the inexpressible” (321). 
 
In accordance with religion, through this conceptualization, the attention is only 
given to the highest mental being that rests solely on man and the language in him. 
However, objects Benjamin, that language is not only expressed in things themselves.  
This proposition also inaugurates that “the language of things are imperfect and dumb. 
Things are denied through by the pure formal principle of language - sound” (321). 
Things can be communicated through a more or less material community. For Benjamin, 
this community, like every other community, is immaterial and purely mental, “and the 
symbol of this [community] is sound” (321).  The symbol of sound, which can only 
accord that purely mental and immaterial state of language, can only communicate itself 
through a less material community through its infiniteness and magic. Bible has already 
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expressed this: “when it says that God breathes his breath into man: this is at once life 
and mind and language” (321).  
Two well-known arguments in Bible are (i) in the first chapter of Genesis; the 
first sentence above renders the language as “an ultimate reality, perceptible only in its 
manifestation, inexplicable and mystical” (322), (ii) the second version of the story of 
the Creation, also reports that through the God’s breath into man, “man was made from 
earth” (322), and is the only reference to the material in which God (Creator) expresses 
his will, “which is otherwise thought of as creation without mediation” (322). In the 
second story, the creation of man did not happen through word; God spoke and man got 
the gift of language and elevated above nature.    
The phrase “He made” is open about the investigation of the creation out of 
material. But the rhythm by which the creation of nature is accomplished occurs through 
three phrases: “Let there be”, “He made (created)”, “He named”.  The relation of the 
creative act to language is established by the two occurrences of the phrases “Let there 
be” and “He made” at the beginning (as ‘word’) and “He names” at the end (as ‘name’) 
of the first story of Creation. Therefore, language is both a creative and finished 
creation, it is both word and name. In God name is creative because it is word, and 
God’s word is cognizant in it through name. The absolute relation of name to knowledge 
exists only in God. Only there is the name, because it is inwardly identical with the 
creative word, which is “the pure medium of knowledge” (my underline -323). 
In this tripartite rhythm of the creation of nature, language has different 
meanings. God did not create man from the word, and he did not name him. God did not 
wish to subject him to language, but set language in him. And this let man as the 
medium of creation “free to name” (323). It is this creativity that Benjamin mentions, 
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“relieved of its divine actuality, became knowledge” (323). Thus, through the same 
medium (that is, language), man is the knower/namer and God the creator.  
 
“His [man’s] mental being is the language in which creation took place, 
and God’s linguistic being is the word. All human language is only 
reflection of the word in name. Name is no closer to the word than 
knowledge to creation. The infinity of human language always remains 
limited and analytical in nature in comparison to the absolutely unlimited 
and creative infinity of the divine word” (my underline - 323).    
 
Thus, the theory of proper names (the names of man) is the theory of the frontier 
between finite (man’s) and infinite (God’s) language. Benjamin asserts that the “deepest 
image of this divine word” is the point where the infinitude of the pure word cannot 
become finite word and knowledge (323) since of all beings man is the only one who 
himself names his own kind, as he is the only one whom God did not name.  
To destroy the concept of language of the mental being of man as an immaterial 
community where the things are denied by sound, Benjamin insists that through the 
word, man is always bound to material things. Thus the two views on the 
conceptualization of language fail. The first one is the ‘bourgeois view’ in the statement 
that a man names and that the word has an accidental relation to its object, “that it is a 
sign for things (or knowledge of them) agreed by some convention” (324). In fact, 
inserts Benjamin, “Language never gives mere signs” (original italics – 324). The 
second view as demonstrated by the examples from Bible is what Benjamin calls the 
‘mystical linguistic theory’ and it maintains that the word is simply the essence of the 
thing. “This is incorrect”, maintains Benjamin, “because the thing in itself has no word, 
since it is being created from God’s word and known in its name by human word” (324).  
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The word of God is not creative in word but has aimed to give birth to the 
language of things themselves, “from which, in turn, soundlessly, in the mute magic of 
nature, the word of God shines forth” (my underline - 325).  In this conceptualization 
and the spontaneous creation of the word, Benjamin reaches his main point; “language 
has its own word” and moreover, this conception is also enacted “by the nameless in 
names” (325). The question of translation intrudes in here, which for Benjamin is not a 
surprise to find at the deepest level of linguistic theory. The translatability of languages 
into one another can only be conceived “between media of varying densities” and passes 
through “continua of transformations” but “not abstract areas of identity and similarity” 
(325).  
The translation of the languages of things into the language of man “is a 
translation of nameless into name”, “a translation of an imperfect language into a more 
perfect one” and can only add “knowledge” to it (325).  The objectivity of translation is 
guaranteed by God, since he created things and named them later on, however, God’s 
name remains only as “an expression of the identity of the creative word” (325) and 
thus, a solution to the task of giving-names is alluded to man. Man does this task by 
receiving the soundless-nameless language of things and naming them with sound.  
Otherwise, confusion would arrive, says Benjamin, to the extent that the same 
word had given birth both to the name-language of man and the nameless-language of 
God, would become the “communication of matter in magic communion” (325). Thus, 
in the previously mentioned contemplation of God’s naming (who names things but 
which  are mute) and the naming of man (to make them sonic) is implied the 
communicating of the muteness of things (animals, nature) toward the language of man.   
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Thus, man cannot name things, make them sonic by himself unless God has 
already created them in muteness. The falling short of the naming act, and reciprocally, 
of the creative word of God, infers the multiplicity of human languages. Through 
translation, in which the passage of the language of things into the (language of 
knowledge, in other words, the language of man), man falls from the ‘paradisiac’ state 
“that knew only one language” (326). This paradisiac language was the perfect 
knowledge, but later, knowledge has been forced to differentiate itself in the multiplicity 
of languages “on a lower level as creation in name” (326).   
The language-mind of men is blissful wherever it can state the muteness of 
nature. After God’s word (logos) curses the ground, the appearance of nature changes. 
Its deepest sadness springs forth. “It is a metaphysical truth that nature would begin to 
lament if it were endowed with language. (Though to “endow with language” is more 
than “to make able to speak” (original parentheses - 329)). This proposition has two 
meanings, (i) she [nature] would lament the language; it would become speechless: “that 
is the great sorrow of nature (and for the sake of her redemption from the life and 
language of man – not only, as is supposed, of the poet – are in nature)” (original 
parentheses - 329). (ii) she would lament; “Lament, however, is the most 
undifferentiated, impotent expression of language; it contains scarcely more than the 
sensuous breath; and where there is only a rustling of plants, in it there is always a 
lament. Because she is mute, nature mourns” (329). When inverted into the essence of 
nature, Benjamin says that it is the sadness that makes her mute. To be named always 
resides mourning and what mourns always feels it thoroughly known by the 
unknowable.  
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It is God who called things into being by their proper names, thus their calls only 
have their proper names in God. However, in man, things are over-named. ‘Over-
naming’ is the deepest linguistic reason for all melancholy and deliberate muteness. “To 
be named –even when the namer is Godlike and blissful- perhaps always remains an 
intimation of mourning” (330).   
Then, Benjamin comes to his real and most prominent point; “There is a 
language of sculpture, of painting, of poetry” (330). His warning about this possible 
language of art is that it should not be a wholistic one, but fragmentary. If it would be 
wholistic, then this language would be a language of man where he again would start to 
name things. “For an understanding of artistic forms is valuable to attempt to grasp them 
all as languages and to seek their connection with natural languages” (330).   However, 
the language of poetry is partly founded in the language of man, the language of painting 
and sculpture can likely be found in the language of things, in which “we find a 
translation of the language of things into an infinitely higher language, which may still 
be of the same sphere” (330). There are languages of art, of matter, of the nameless and 
of the mute.  
If I am to remind what Benjamin said in the previous paragraphs; the communal 
communication of things in language is ‘wholistic’. To grasp them in particularity, 
Benjamin alludes to seek their connection with natural languages. The best example is 
the “acoustic kinship” between song and the language of birds (331). In a dualistic 
analogy with previous example, Benjamin assigns the language of art with the doctrine 
of signs. Without this “original” and “fundamental” relationship, all linguistic theory 
would “fragmentary” (331). Moreover, this relationship also provides another antithesis. 
“For language is in every case not only the communication of the communicable but 
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also, at the same time, a symbol of the noncommunicable” (331). The symbolic side of 
language, which is what produces the mere signs, also, extends to judgment and name. 
And all of these aspects are what always renders language as communicable. 
These propositions above, leave Benjamin with his very final (“purified”) 
conception of language, “even though it may still be an imperfect one”, to summarize all 
of his argumentation (331).  
“The language of an entity is the medium in which its mental being is 
communicated. The uninterrupted flow of this communication runs 
through the whole of nature from the lowest forms of existence to man 
and from man to God. Man communicates himself to God through name, 
which he gives to nature (in proper names) to his own kind, and to nature 
he gives names according to the communication that he receives from 
her, for the whole of nature, too, is imbued with a nameless, unspoken 
language, the residue of the creative word of God, which is preserved in 
man as the cognizing name and above man as the judgment suspended 
over him”(331).  
 
 My concern with Benjamin’s essay is to take his last statements as my departure. 
Over it, I want to engage myself, first of all, with the problem of language as ‘idea’, 
what Benjamin refers as the mental being of man. Secondly, I want to lay problematical 
the statement of the mourning nature if ever constituted with language, which Benjamin, 
also rejects as a metaphysical truth but adds that she is sad because she is already named. 
What other kinds of mechanism are in work here? If nature has a language, what kind of 
a language would it be? Would we not always fall back to the trap of understanding 
nature through understanding oneself as a subject? And including nature within our 
subjectivity? Would it not be antropomorphic? Would be able to understand its radical 
otherness? Or would we treat it as a necessary topoi to contruct the identity of the 
subject? And thus, is it ever possible to talk about a language of nature? Or could there 
be another view on language other than both the bourgeois and mystical theories that 
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would not let us engage nature either as physis or topoi at all? In short, Benjamin has 
asked questions that endure their telos in themselves, and leave the subject-matter still 
“pre-critical” when seen from Derrida’s point of view; because without constituting the 
nature/culture opposition, how could he even pose his question about the nature that is 
sad because it is named by man? And if such a constitution is ever done 
(surreptitiously), then how can he ever insert or ever repeat all those oppositions 
between nameless/ (in the) name, inexpressible/ expressible, muteness/sound, lower 
languages/higher languages, whole/fragment - although they all belong to metaphysics? 
If one can be permitted, in fact, this could be called (without the burden of equating 
calling and naming as one and the same thing) the ‘telostic’ view of Benjamin. Thirdly, I 
will ally with the concept of ‘mimesis’ in his entire outline of the theories of language, 
although, strangely, the word is not found in the essay. However, what Benjamin ever 
says about ‘mimesis’ is best draped in his essay ‘On The Mimetic Faculty’.  
 
2.2. Onomatopoeia and the Difference/Similarity of Languages 
 
In an unsurprising manner, Benjamin opens his essay, ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ 
with this sentence: “Nature creates similarities. One need only think of mimicry” (333). 
However, the highest capacity for producing those similarities is entailed to ‘man’, for 
Benjamin. Play is the fundamental trait of the history of this faculty and is clustered by 
two spheres; phylogenetic (related to the evolutionary development of history) and 
ontogenetic (related to the origin and development of the individual organism). To 
lighten an example, Benjamin alludes to children’s play, which is everywhere permeated 
by mimetic modes of behavior and the realm of this mimetic behavior is always limited 
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to imitation. However, in play, the child “plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher 
but also a windmill and a train” (333).  
The historical view of the mimetic faculty that has been governed by the law of 
similarity, has ruled both microcosm and macrocosm. However, for Benjamin, this view 
is not enough to think of what we understand today and has changed within historical 
development. Although the ancients had different manners of using mimesis, we 
(moderns) have a canon that still enables us to create nonsensuous similarities; this 
canon is language. The role of mimetic behavior in language has been left without 
consideration; largely, it has been acknowledged under the name of onomatopoeia. If 
language is agreed to be not a system of signs (which Benjamin has already disproved in 
‘On the Language as Such and On the Language of Man’), Benjamin’s reservations 
reside on the question whether the onomatopoeic mode of explanation could be 
developed and adapted to improve understanding.   
Benjamin rejects the proposal that every word in the whole of language is 
onomatopoeic, for it is difficult to conceive in any detail the program that the 
proposition entails. If words mean the same thing in different languages, it must be 
shown what constitutes this similarity. And this relationship, for Benjamin, cannot be 
shown when stayed restricted to spoken words because they are equally concerned with 
the written word. The written word also illuminates a relationship with what it signifies 
in the sphere of nonsensuous similarity. This nonsensuous similarity not only determines 
the relation between the spoken and the signified but also “between the written and the 
signified, and equally between the spoken and the written” (335).  
The exemplar phenomena where this relationship could be grasped best, for 
Benjamin, is graphology. The unconscious images created in the handwriting of the 
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writer expresses the utmost importance of the mimetic process involved. “Script has thus 
become like language, an archive of nonsensous similarities, of nonsensuous 
correspondences” (335).  
However, the scriptural aspect of language cannot be thought as isolated from its 
bearer; that is, its semiotic element. “Thus the coherence of words or sentences is the 
bearer through which, like a flash, similarity appears” (335). As a recourse to astrology, 
he states that the production of similarity is “limited to flashes. It flits past” (335). And 
this is why, for example, the rapid writing and reading can be considered as the fusion of 
semiotic and mimetic in the realm of language; “To read what was never written”” 
(336). This proposition, for Benjamin, is the most ancient; “reading before all languages, 
from the entrails, the stars or dances” (336). This is so because writing is everywhere, all 
has been written is driven to images in mimesis. That, again, is the reason why readings 
of hieroglyphs and of runes came into use to admit writing and language to the realm of 
mimetic gift. “In this way language may be seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior 
and the most complete archive of nonsensuous similarity: a medium into which the 
earlier [occult] powers of mimetic production and comprehension have passed without 
residue, to the point where they have liquated those of magic” (336).  
Even though, Benjamin does not predict out any further points, in this article, one 
can detect the necessary points for the purposes of this study. For Benjamin, language is 
the highest level of mimetic behavior and nonsensous similarity. He grasps writing as a 
representation here. Again, Benjamin’s assertions are still on the edge of oppositions 
such as macrocosm/microcosm, similarity/non-similarity. Further, while considering 
whether the graphology of a writing subject can still create a nonsensous similarity of 
him(her)self, does he not fall into the trap of the same ‘teleological’ phenomena of all 
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writing? At the end, is this not a search for a similarity that at its limit would always re-
produce the subject?   
To demonstrate the constitutive relationship of ‘idea’ that Benjamin allies 
throughout the essay, I will go to the origin of the formation of language in Plato’s 
Cratylus, for it is these relationships that Benjamin sees in his essay without saying. In 
the Greek expression for ‘word’ (onoma) means ‘name’ and especially ‘proper name’- 
as the name by which something is called. A name is what it is because someone is 
called by it and answers back to the call. Thus, the word belongs to its bearer, to its 
being. What sets the background of Plato’s Cratylus is the doubt of the philosophical 
inquiry whether the word can represent the thing that is substituting for it, or a talk about 
the unity of the word and the thing as the correctness of the words, be possible.  
There are two different arguments that are present in Cratylus. One theory (one 
can call it the conventionalist theory or the ‘bourgeois view’ as Benjamin states) regards 
that the unambiguous linguistic usage reached by agreement and practice is the only 
sources for the meaning of words. The opposed theory holds that there is a natural 
agreement between word and object that is described by the idea of correctness. The 
following example given by Socrates is the case of ‘special languages’. Children and 
lovers likewise have their own language, by which they communicate with each other in 
a world that belongs to them alone. It is not just because they have agreed on it but 
because a custom has grown between them even if it is a play world. Thus, the 
difference between two views is due to the production of the degree of the convention; 
for the first one, the agreement is the only source of meaning, whereas for the second 
one, the agreement is a natural bound. In any case, going with the lines of Benjamin so 
far, both of these theories start from the existence and instrumentality of words, ‘as if’ 
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we know the words ‘fall’ previously from an independent source. Thus, the limitation of 
the mimesis as looking for the similarity of the word and the thing is already clear in 
here. The word is correct only if it brings the thing to the presentation – if it is a 
representation (mimesis) itself. What is involved here is not just an imitative 
representation in the sense of a direct copy that depicts the visual or oral appearance of 
something, but it is the being that is to be revealed by the word. The word that names an 
object names it as what it is because the word itself has the meaning whereby the object 
intended is named, but that does not necessarily imply that the two should be mutually 
integrated as original and copy. The mere imitation (the Similar) or the icon always 
offers a starting point for reflecting the ontological gap between the copy and the 
original. Then, Craytlus must be right since he says that in as much a word is a word, it 
must always be ‘correct’ enough. A copy resembles the original but it is a different thing 
than what it itself represents. The truth of a word does not depend on its correctness but 
rather in its perfect intelligibility and absolute perfection as the manifestness which 
occurs in the sound that goes out of the mouth of the speaker. As copies, all words are 
true. As Socrates has put it that words unlike pictures, cannot be only correct but true. In 
Plato’s writing, Cratylus is depicted to be almost a Sophist or as Socrates says as an 
excited youngsters who does not doubt enough, because he is unaware that the meaning 
of the words is not simply identical with objects named and furthermore less aware (and 
this is Socrates’s superiority) that the manifestation of the things taking place in the 
word is something different from intending to contain what they are. It is the capacity of 
the dialectical procedure, in its discursiveness, to determine what is correct and true and 
what is false and wrong; or better to accept both of them but then choose the true one 
and exclude the false. Socrates’s plenipotentiary is implemented by Plato’s expel that the 
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adequate expression of a word is only used by the extent that it is used rightly or 
wrongly. This association is not just linked to the word but rather to the idea/model of 
the word (logos). As Benjamin has showed us, to name someone or something is to call 
(in the fall) that thing; for example, to name someone by a word Socrates is to call him 
Socrates.   
Thus the relational ordering of logos is much more than mere correspondence of 
words and things as would also be deciphered when they are stated as copies. The truth 
contained in the logos is not the mere perception, not letting being appear, but rather it 
always places being in a relationship and assigns something to it. For this reason, it is 
not the word but the logos that is the bearer of truth. This is the conclusion that Cratylus 
is drawn into but it remains number of important claims for the concerns of this study.   
If the sphere of the logos represents the sphere of the name, then the word 
becomes the mere sign that is defined and is pre-known. We are not starting from the 
thing and inquiring it into the being of the word. Rather, we are starting from the word 
as a means in itself and asking how it communicates to the person who speaks and uses 
it. By its very nature, the sign is plucked from its context and communicates its “self” to 
an “other”. It does not even need to have any similarity to its referent, which means 
again that its visible content is reduced to its minimum necessary function. The more a 
sign signifies, the more it gets to be a pure sign.  
On the other side, within the lines of the copy theory that implies that words are 
icons, already copies of the Ideas, the situation is different. The copy implies the same 
contradiction between the being of a word and the meaning of a word, but it does so in 
such a way that it supersedes this contradiction within itself precisely by means of a 
resemblance. It does hold the function of representing the subject who uses it. As 
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Benjamin has already purported, it can never be a mere sign. For the thing copied is 
itself (re)-presented, caught by the tail and made present. That is why it can only be 
judged to the extent of a resemblance of the standard of a ‘model’, by and to which it 
makes present what is not present in itself.     
However, the question whether a word is a ‘pure sign’ or something like a ‘copy’ 
or ‘image’ is what Cratylus discredits and against whom Socrates disputes. Although, 
Benjamin’s starting point is to overturn this dialectical ban, so that one might be 
permitted to talk about a language of music and sculpture, when comprehended through 
the two theories laid out, once this language is ever established, would it not also turn 
into language of pure signs?          
2.3. The Move of Mimesis from the Similar to the Same  
 
In other words, the struggle to capture the similarity of the words with the things 
that represent it or the similarity of the writing with the subject behind it, is what sets the 
telos of Benjamin’s ‘overturning’. Benjamin’s attempt to haunt down this problem in the 
‘meditation of language’ as its ‘magic’ still recurs to what Lacoue-Labarthe defines as 
the move of mimesis “always from similar to the same” (TMPP - 117). Even if that 
language of sculpture and music be established, would Benjamin be able to talk about it 
without recourse back to the fundamental ‘mediation’ of language? If this mediation of 
the language is not within Benjamin’s study, how can he ever ask for a nonsensous 
similarity to be found in the ‘unconscious’ of the writer dropped on the page as his 
script? In other words, does not the origin or the access to the origin-as-a-being always 
transfer a mediation? To repeat: the only method that had allowed Benjamin to disrupt 
the problem of the mediation of language was by integrating ‘a symbol of the 
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uncommunicable’ in the communicability of the language. This is, of course, done to 
abduct the nature from the relativity of judgment and the constant naming process of 
man. However, in this telos, nature is still a necessary topoi of the man/subject. In other 
words, although contrary to his starting point (that is, to break down the concept of 
language as the mental state of man), Benjamin stands pre-critical to ‘usurp’ nature as 
the ‘necessary’ origin from which the language of music and sculpture can form. To 
fasten a language of nature (which is prescribed definitely ‘mute’ for Benjamin) or of 
paintings and sculpture is still ‘to see’ them in a mimesis and imply its necessary 
representation.    
For Lacoue-Labarthe, mimesis (representation) is always from the similar to the 
same. “For such is the law of representation – or of (re)presentation: […] there is 
‘presented’ in it what does not present itself and cannot present itself, that is, there is 
represented in it what has always already represented itself. This is why there is only one 
remedy against representation, infinitely precarious, dangerous and unstable: 
representation itself” (Lacoue-Labarthe 117). One can discern it from the first 
ontological differentiation that Socrates had established against Cratylus and what 
Benjamin repeats. Never really being able to leave nature off, moreover to reserve its 
end in itself away from the naming-language of man, establishing it as the telos, seeing it 
as the ‘unexpressible’ in the expressed as the trace of what is not given in the 
representation but which has always already been presented (and therefore has to be 
‘revealed’) is still an approximation of what Lacoue-Labarthe calls the ‘hyperbological 
mimetology’. In Lacoue-Labarthe’s words; this is what  “theatricality 
“reveals””(original quotations – 117) that always works to put on stage and to 
theatricalize it in order to try to catch it in the trap of an internalization process, to 
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agonize to make it the subject’s own; “more rigorously, to mask and to reveal, regarding 
mimesis, to betray and to unveil: these are – as finally we could never hope to say better 
– to go  from like to the same” (117). This means to determine the icon in a ratio to the 
eidetic model. Thus, even if such a language of nature would be established, nature 
would only be an icon in it for as has been seen that words as the constitutive elements 
of any language are already representations.      
As the central concern of this thesis would imply that a path of abstraction 
always and ultimately would lead to the rational construction of an artificial language of 
‘music and sculpture’ or ‘nature’. Language and thinking about things are so bound 
together that it is an abstraction to conceive of the system of truths as a pre-given system 
of possibilities of being, that initiates a subject who is supposed to select the appropriate 
signs. A word is not a sign that one selects, a language is not a mere instrument that we 
construct, on the comeuppance of which one gives an ideality of meaning to make 
another thing ‘visible’ through it. Rather, the ideality of the thing lies in the word itself, 
every thing can always-already produce meaning without instituting its origin in itself 
because no origin is a pre-conceived ‘being’.    
As Lacoue-Labarthe maintains that mimesis always starts where the fear about 
the plasticity (fashioning, modeling and fictioning) arises with the imposition of the sign 
which marks that language is itself a fiction. Otherwise, it would fall into the absolute 
dream of philosophy; “absolute (in)sight, the subject theorizing its own conception and 
engendering itself in seeing itself to do so – the speculative” (127). In the original 
dependency of the subjection of the ‘speaking-being’ to maintain the relationship 
between the word and the thing that it represents, the subject is always engendered by 
the order of the figure or the fictive in general. For Lacoue-Labarthe, this limit which 
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does not hold a boundary, is where, “An entire Western discourse on the subject right 
away seems to find its limit here; a limit that would lie less […] in the necessary 
reversibility of the motifs of engenderment and of the figure, of conception and of the 
plastic, or if you will, in this kind of reciprocal and insurmountable metaphorical 
(figural) exchange between concepts of origin and fiction” (127-8).      
 
3.  THE RUPTURE: WHAT REPEATS, WHAT DIFFERS 
 
The significance of a reading of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory is to depict the 
exemplary attempt of how such languages of sculpture and music (of art, in general) can 
be employed and to where it might ever lead. As given in his book, that he is a follower 
of Benjamin’s request on language of sculpture and music which would protrude from 
‘nature’. Although, a strange stance in opposition to his ‘negative dialectics’, Adorno’s 
whole approach to art and his maintenance of a peculiar concept of ‘becoming’ towards 
the end of Aesthetic Theory, inevitably falls back into the unconcealing or masking trap 
of dialectics.      
 And the reason of a reading of Adorno’s (together with Horkheimer) reading of 
the concepts of difference and repetition is to lay out the problem of their reading of 
these concepts under negation, according to their distance from the model, when 
reviewed later on, will give us the possibility of talking about the formation of a 
language that neither repeats nor differs; in short, a language that does not work on 
negation.  
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3.1.  Telos: Adorno’s Discourse on Mimesis and Art 
3.1.1 Repetition: Myth and Self-Sacrifice/ Self-Preservation  
 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno purport that the 
fundamental claims of enlightenment and mythology, far from the latter’s unending 
attempt at the usurpation of the established hierarchy, are the same. In this fragmentary 
phenomenology of spirit, Horkheimer and Adorno find a potentially fatal flip in the 
early stages of Western Civilization. The flip occurs during the time of patriarchal 
myths. Myth modulates toward enlightenment in a phase, marked by Olympian and 
Hebraic religions, when ‘bourgeois’ society replaces nomadism, thought becomes 
independent, magic turns into rational praxis, and the human subject awakens to the 
world’s rational domination. The book is a critical reading which is, neither, not just a 
celebration of mythology or mythic forces that underpin enlightenment and its entire 
project, nor to recover the content of the former to fling it over the latter. The task for 
Horkheimer and Adorno is to demythologize that deification. This, for Adorno and 
Horkheimer are done by stating that the bourgeois culture achieved by Enlightenment 
has always already been established, not thoroughly in nineteenth century but even 
previously in Homer’s Odyssey.  
The ultimate self-preservation of man is the domination over the nature and his 
own instincts. Man’s being thrown from nature in the encounter with her as negated 
distinct entity results in the separation of subject and object, mental and physical labor, 
internal and external nature etc.      
 Given this constellation, myth is already enlightenment and enlightenment 
reverts to mythology. Whence substantive reason is reverted to instrumental reason in 
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the service of exchange for the principle of equivalence, it leads to the domination of 
nature for the exploitation of the capital. The reason destroys the humanity for the sake 
of self-preservation of ‘individuality’. However, the preserved-self emancipated from 
myths can only employ himself in endless repetition and by the same token, pays the 
price in self-sacrifice. In short, the ‘emancipated man’ of Enlightenment sacrifices 
himself, his instincts and nature for the rubric of identity that always works for self-
preservation and identity construction. In the absorbed repetition of the mythic thought 
which enlightenment never really knows how to elude, the emancipated man of 
enlightenment can only maintain himself in self-sacrifice. For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
the barter is the absolute principle of exchange and equivalence is the most secular form 
of sacrifice. The self-preserving subject of enlightenment thought by denying the 
mythology denies his internal nature, sacrifices himself in the exchange of a sacrifice 
with Gods.     
The critical example used by Adorno and Horkheimer is the reading of Homer’s 
Odyssey chapter. For the authors, in the separation between mythos and epos as two 
distinct genres implemented by Enlightenment, it is certain that the portrayed epic is a 
perfect depiction of the self-preserving/self-sacrificing subject trying to struggle with the 
mythic power; “[…] the hero of the adventures shows himself to be a prototype of the 
bourgeois individual, a notion originating in the consistency of self-affirmation which 
has its ancient pattern in the figure of the protagonist compelled to wander” (43).  It is 
the plot, which connects all the fragments under the theme of Odysseus’s struggle for 
self-preservation against all menaces. In each episode, by cunning, escape, danger of the 
self-sacrifice, Odysseus gains his identity and spills the union of his internality and 
externality. With each adventure, Odysseus looses himself in order to find himself. For 
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example, in the rejection of listening to the song of Sirens, which guarantees the 
happiness of the domination over nature, Odysseus pays the price by forever being 
discarded from home. Instead, he wills to be tied to the mast of his ship to lead to his 
own way. For Adorno and Horkheimer, Odysseus’s self-sacrifice here recurs back to 
self-preservation by learning to dominate his internal nature in the service of 
instrumental reason of the principle of equivalence.        
What must be paid attention here is what Adorno and Horkheimer understand 
‘repetition’ and ‘difference’. The bourgeois individual is the one who constructs an 
identity and makes a difference but he is forever to remain in the endless repetition of 
the same things. Therefore, for the authors, more difference (dissimilarity) creates more 
repetition. They also see both difference and repetition as mimesis itself or 
representation as a ‘being’ without forgetting that they are already copies. In other 
words, what is it that Adorno and Horkheimer mould in Odysseus’s adventure of not 
being able to return home? According to their own method, it is for sure that Odysseus 
leaves his home, in the world governed by the principle of equivalence, he is going to 
establish a home somewhere else. However, is not this usurpation itself still can find its 
similarity in the question of searching for ‘origin’? Or their attempt at the reading of 
enlightenment through myths, or establishing an untimely importance to ‘magic’ as the 
praxis of myths is an approximation of a meditation, magic a as an ultimate medium in 
its ideality to break down to a fragmentary state? If the fragment is a fragment, it is a 
fragment with its relation to the whole. Then instead of a search for the subject in the 
form of an example, which is, inevitably, always found ‘in the mediation of magic’ or 
‘under the principle of equivalence’, could we talk about space (which is not a necessary 
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topoi for the subject’s self-affirmation) where this subject could be deconstructed 
without a ‘margin’?  
 
3.1.2. The Scene of Aesthetics: Mimesis from the Similar to the Same  
Artworks’ attempt to hold off the nonexistent within the existent is due to their 
attempt to assemble apparition (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 83). “As figures of the 
existing, unable to summon into existence the nonexisting, artworks draw their authority 
from the reflection they compel on how they could be the overwhelming of the 
nonexisting if it did not exist in itself” (83). For Adorno, if the Platonic definition of 
art’s semblance character against the omnipresence of being and idea was true then art 
would not ever be needed. Art negates the literal reality of its thematic content in its 
form as allied with the philistine blindness for the central element of art. The function of 
unsureness and lie labeled on art cannot be rubbed off art; “nothing can guarantee that it 
will keep its objective promise. Therefore, for Adorno, “every theory of art must, at the 
same time, be the critique of art” (83). Consequently, artworks are images as apparition, 
as apperance and not as a copy. The image character of artworks had passed into reality. 
What happens in art is no longer the unity and harmony but dissonance and 
contradiction. This paradox is what the artworks appropriate. If apparition is the 
illumination of the enlightenment’s claim to vanish any residue of the mystery of them, 
art is the sole process of the transfixation of this evanescent instant. Adorno, here, refers 
to Benjamin’s dialectic at a standstill and his dialectical image. “If, as images, artworks 
are the persistence of the transient, they are concentrated in appearance as something 
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momentary. To experience art means to become conscious of its immanent process as an 
instant at a standstill […]” (84).   
However, in his prolongation, Adorno will enunciate that artworks not only 
produce imagines that endure but do they become artworks as much through their ability 
to destruct that imagine. Thus, they are not just allegories; they are the catastrophic 
fulfillment of allegories. The result of the dissonant and contradictory forces that they 
carry in themselves is conjured out as the impossibility of bringing them to any 
equilibrium and to remain unsolvable in the reconciled world. “The instant in which 
these forces become image, the instant in which what is interior becomes exterior, the 
outer husk is exploded; their apparition, which makes them an image, always at the 
same time destroys them as image” (original italics – 85). In this rupture of apparition, 
the countertendency that Adorno finds is the occurrence of caesura that no longer 
permits the totality of appearance to be.    
Thus, for Adorno, art is a refuge for mimetic comportment. In the realm of art, 
with various autonomy the subject [artist] exposes itself, to its other. The level of 
autonomy derives from the point that this other “is separated from the subject and yet 
not altogether separated” (53). However, this mimetic element of art can only be 
possible “in the midst of rationality, and that it employs means, it is a response to the 
faulty irrationality of the rational world as an overadministered world” (53). Then, in 
this world of rationality, since its sole aim is always to preserve the means of dominating 
nature in a capitalist society, art is registered to estimate its truth in a double sense; “it 
maintains the image of its aim, which has been obscured by rationality and it convicts 
the status quo of its rationality and absurdity ” (my italics - 54). In the disenchanted 
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world, what Adorno sees is a repression of the magic heritage of art and its usurped 
outcome as ‘ideology’.  For this reason, “the sentimentality and debility of almost the 
whole tradition of aesthetic thought is that it has suppressed the dialectic of rationality 
and mimesis immanent to art” (my italics - 54). In this cluster, the survival of mimesis, 
“the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively produced with its unposited other”, 
constructs art as a technical knowledge and to that extent ‘rational’. In that respect, then, 
art is always posited as a ‘telos of knowledge’ and completes knowledge, which it had 
excluded. This is the ineliminable ‘aporia’ of art “pulled between the regression to literal 
magic or surrender of the mimetic impulse to thinglike rationality” (54). To gather its 
univocity, art, unable to fulfill its concept, acts as complementary to knowledge and 
complements what has been excluded by it; that is ‘magic’. In the midst of the 
secularization, the process of art through the essence of magic “sinks to the level of a 
mythological vestige, to superstition” (54).  The irreconcilability of these elements 
“must be imported into the idea of art as an image of reconciliation” (my italics –54). In 
the depth of this process, art can catch a glimpse of reconciliation, for no artwork can 
approach emphatically to its free forces. This is why “art is rationality that criticizes 
rationality without drawing from it; art is not something prerational or irrational, which 
would peremptorily condemn it as untruth in the face of entanglement of all human 
activity in the social totality. Rational and irrational theories of art are therefore equally 
faulty” (55).  
The category of the new has produced a conflict between new and duration for 
Adorno. “Through duration art protests against death; the paradoxically transient eternity 
of artworks is the allegory of an eternity, bare of semblance. Art is the semblance of 
what is beyond death’s reach” (27). At this conjecture, Adorno conjures mimesis to 
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artistic production. “Mimesis ties art to individual human experience, which is now 
exclusively that of being-for-itself. That there is no persevering at this subjective point is 
by no means only because the artwork forfeits that otherness in which the aesthetic 
subject is exclusively able to objectivate itself. Clearly the concept of duration –as 
ineluctable as it is problematic- cannot be unified with the idea that the subjective point 
is also a temporal one.” (30). This amounts, for Adorno, that the artworks have no power 
over whether they endure, “it is least of all guaranteed when the putatively time-bound is 
eliminated in favor of the timeless” (27). Only when that temporal permanence is 
constituted, the timelessness and transience can take place in the specific context of the 
artwork. Consequently, Adorno’s thesis is that “The new is the longing for the new, not 
the new itself. That is what everything new suffers from” (32).  
Moreover, this suffering itself is the negation of utopia. What irrupts in this 
negation of the utopia is the ‘image of collapse’: 
 
“In this image of collapse, all the stigmata of the repulsive and loathsome 
in modern art gather. Through the irreconcilable renunciation of the 
semblance of reconciliation, art holds fast to the promise of reconciliation 
in the midst of the unreconciled: This is the true consciousness of an age 
in which the real possibility of utopia – that given the level of productive 
forces, the earth could here and now be paradise – converges with the 
possibility of total catastrophe. In the image of catastrophe, an image that 
is not a copy of the event but the cipher of its potential, the magical trace 
of art’s most distant pre-history reappears under total spell, as if art 
wanted to prevent the catastrophe by conjuring up its image. The taboo 
set on the historical telos is the single legitimation of that whereby the 
new comprises itself politically and practically: its claim to being an end 
in itself” (33). 
 
 Adorno, however, affirms that art is not replica of the artist (subject) but without 
saying it, he still inaugurates Hegel’s criticism of the popular view that the artist must be 
more than his own work:  
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“[…] for not infrequently that he is less, the empty husk of what he 
objectivated in the work. It hold equally true that no artwork can succeed 
except to the degree that the subject gives it shape from out of himself. It 
is not for the subject, as the organon of art, overleap the process of 
divisive individuation that is imposed on him and not a matter of opinion 
or accidental consciousness. This situation therefore compels art –as 
something spiritual – to undergo subjective mediation in its objective 
constitution. The share of subjectivity in the artwork is itself a piece of 
objectivity. Certainly the mimetic element that is indispensable to art is, 
as regards its substance, universal, but it cannot be reached other than by 
way of the inextinguishably idiosyncratic particular subject” (41).  
 
 Estimated by the doctrine of normal bourgeois consciousness, art has never been 
able to break epistemologically through solipsism and “[…] was necessarily and directly 
“intersubjective” ” (original quotations - 42 ). Adorno calls for this epistemology to be 
reversed.  “The former has the ability through critical self-reflection to destroy the spell 
of solipsism, whereas the subjective point of reference in art remains that which 
solipsism has merely feigned in reality. Art is the historicophilosophical truth of a 
solipsism that is untrue in-itself. In art there is no possible willful overcoming of the 
situation that philosophy has unjustly hypostatized. Aesthetic semblance is what 
solipsism extra-aesthetically confuses with truth” (42-3) The subject should manifest his 
own subjectivity by his surplus beyond what he wants to negate down and never forget 
to carry out the contradiction in himself. However, Adorno has a formula for the 
somewhat pertinent survival of art; “To date the only alternative to this has been the 
polemical intervention of the subject in the subjective reason by a surplus of the 
subject’s own manifestation beyond that in which it wants to negate itself. Only by 
carrying this contradiction, and not by its false resolution, can art somehow still 
survive” (my italics - AT 58).  Even though, this is surreptitiously another ultimate 
subjectivization of split of subject in Hegel, Adorno will upkeep that “this incongruity is 
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not to be eliminated by adaptation: The truth, rather, is in carrying through their conflict. 
Conversely, the deaestheticization of art is immanent to art –whether it be art that 
unflinchingly pursues its autonomous order or art that sells off cheap- in accordance 
with the technological tendency of art, which is not to be halted by any appeal to a 
purportedly pure and unmediated inwardness”(58).   
The determination of artworks as images result in their negation embedded in 
themselves as their telos; “the sudden unfolding of appearance disclaims aesthetic 
semblance” (85). In rejection to any historicism, Adorno maintains, that artworks are not 
beings “absolved from becoming” but rather they have their own development. The 
appearance in the artworks is their inner time and history is their content. Thus, to 
analyze them means to become conscious of the sediment of history in them. After the 
separation of knowledge into image and sign, the truth of them gets equalized with the 
truth. The reality that they embed is their content, however they should not be 
hypostatized - even historical images; “Aesthetic images are not fixed, archaic 
invariants: artworks become images in the processes that have congealed in them as 
objectivity become eloquent” (85). Even the bourgeois art-religion of considering the 
artworks as artist’s psychological repository representations fail in that respect. Because 
their inner historicity (including that of the individual-bourgeois artist) is experienced 
collectively. “Every language of artworks is, like every language, constituted by a 
collective undercurrent, especially in the case of those works popularly stigmatized as 
lonely and walled up in ivory tower: the eloquence of their collective substance 
originates in their image character and not in the “testimony” –as the cliché goes- that 
they supposedly wish to express directly to the collective” (original quotations -86).  In 
this both static and dynamic affiliation, the result is their aim for the trajectory that they 
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traverse as imago. Although produced subjectively as not images of something and 
precisely collective to be mediated for experience, they are not fixation or forming as 
they are usually perceived; “artworks diverge from empirical reality; emperia through 
empirical deformation” (86).       
Art is comportment and it cannot be isolated from expression and that expression 
cannot be without a subject. If Hegel was right and the very work of the artist was able 
to reach beyond his own stance, then he “[…] must in return pay the price that he, in 
contrast to the discursively thinking person, cannot transcend himself and the objectively 
established boundaries” (42). For Adorno even if one day the atomistic structure of 
society would be abolished, the social idea of art would still remain and under the most 
detained form where the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’ diverge. “As long as the 
universal and the particular diverge, there is no freedom” (42). In that respect, for 
whoever would try to resist the collective force would be forced to hand to remain under 
the “veil of subjectivism” (42). Embedded deeply in that ‘veil of subjectivism’, named 
as the critical reflection of the subject, is the force of the subject; “the subject congealed 
as technology” (42), and if production would want to get rid of this force of congealed 
subjectivity and want to make itself autonomous, enclosed in the same trap, they still 
would have “[…] to correct themselves by the way of the subject” (42). 
  For Kant, artworks were purposive as dynamic totalities; in which every 
particular exists for the sake of the whole as the fulfillment or redemption through the 
negation of its elements. What is specific to artworks, then, is that the aesthetic success 
of their form could only be measured by whether the formed object is able to awaken the 
content [Inhalt] sedimented in the form. The hermeneutics of artworks is the degree of 
the translation of their formal elements into that content [Inhalt]. This content, however, 
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does not directly fall into the artworks. Constituted by a counter movement, only when 
stroked in distance, does the content process itself in the artworks.  
“Artistic progress, to the degree that it can be cogently spoken of, is the 
epitome of this movement. Art gains its content [Inhalt] through the 
latter’s determinate negation. The more energetic the negation, the more 
artworks organize themselves according to an immanent purposiveness, 
and precisely thereby do they mold themselves progressively to what they 
negate” (140).     
 
In his attempt at displacing the Kantian notion of a teleology of art modeled on 
organisms, rooted on the unity of reason of the artist’s fantasy and consciousness, 
Adorno infers that the purposiveness of art, free of any practical purpose, is its similarity 
to language; “its being “without a purpose” is its nonconceptuality, that which 
distinguishes art from significative language” (original quotations – 140). Artworks are 
related more to the idea of a language by their own language, which is formed by their 
disparate elements when better syntactically articulated, the more eloquent they become. 
The traditional aesthetics of teleology (Kant) misses the point of objectivity in the 
language of art; “it prejudges the relation of the whole and the part in favor of the 
whole” (140). The dialectics of the reflective power of judgment (Hegel), on the 
contrary, does not take the subordinating concept (which goes beyond and transcends 
them by virtue of their own need) as its starting point, for it is never given. “By the force 
of their dialectic, artworks escape myth, the blind and abstractly dominating nexus of 
nature” (140).   
Adorno also makes a distinction between what he calls as virtual content 
[Gehalt] and content [Inhalt]. Adorno makes this distinction to differentiate himself 
from Hegel’s aesthetics but unfortunately falls into it. Virtual content is the artistic 
content. “Everything appearing in the artwork is virtually content [Gehalt] as much as it 
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is form, whereas form remains that by which the appearing determines itself and content 
remains what is self-determining” (145). To the extent that aesthetics achieved an 
energetic concept of form, it opposed the preartistic view of art by seeking what is 
specifically aesthetic by detecting the transformations of form. Not being able to bear 
the preartistic view of art that Hegel’s too easily called ‘end of art’ thesis tried to 
salvage, Adorno comes to terms with Hegel; “[…] Hegel is right that all aesthetic 
processes are bound up with content [Inhalt], just as in the history of the plastic arts and 
literature new levels of the external world constantly become apparent and are 
discovered and assimilated, whereas others perish, lose their artistic potential, and no 
longer excite even the worst commercial painter to grant them a brief eternity on 
canvas” (145). However, in the dialectics of whole and fragment, it is content [Inhalt] 
that always desires the whole, whereas the virtual (artistic) content [Gehalt] can remain 
fragmentary. The plight of form is manifested in artworks by their difficulty of coming 
to an end. This is why, artworks lose themselves in order to find themselves and “suffer 
from their mediated totality no less than their immediateness” (147).     
Art always passes through universal alienation and thus through spirit. Art 
always oscillates between ideology and the domain spirit. For Adorno, through 
spiritualization as the radical domination of nature, “art corrects the domination of 
nature as the domination of an other” (113). Although by its objectivation, freeing itself 
from the aims of domination by continuing the totality of spirit in them and becoming 
the semblance of a blocked being-in-itself, art corrects conceptual knowledge in its 
complete isolation so that through a subjective act what is objective would be unveiled. 
However, what presents itself as the non-alienated in the artwork, also, establishes its 
fetish character, “what comports itself in the world as though it were unidentical nature 
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reduced all the more surely to the material of the domination of nature, to a vehicle of 
social domination, and thus is surely alienated” (113).  
 Expression is the tool that creates this alienation. “Expression, by which nature 
seeps most deeply into art, is at the same time what is not literally not nature, a memento 
of what expression itself is not, of what could not have become concrete through the 
how of that expression” (113). The insertion of expression in the artworks, which always 
leads to their spiritualization is what always makes everything relative and integrates a 
clumsy dualism between form and expression that orients the traditional aesthetics.  
“Expression is an phenomenon of interference, a function of technical process no less 
than it is mimetic” (114). Mimesis is the density of the technical procedure, whose 
immanent rationality seems to work in opposition to expression. This is what the 
paradox and enigma of art is; “to produce what is blind, expression, by way of 
reflection, that is, through form: not to rationalize the blind but to produce it 
aesthetically” (113).  
 Then Adorno hints one of his main points of his aesthetic theory, “all artworks 
are enigmas; since antiquity, this has been an irritation to theory” (120). The artworks 
say something and in the same breath conceal out and express their enigmaticalness 
through language. In coming to be a form, artworks gain their resemblance to language; 
“seeming at every point to say just this and only this and at the same time whatever it is 
slips away” (120). Constituting the enigmatical structure of the artworks leads Adorno to 
the derivation that it is impossible to explain what art is to those who have no feeling for 
it.  
 
“Whoever seeks to understand artworks exclusively through the 
immanence of consciousness within them by this very measure fails to 
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understand them and as such understanding grows, so does the feeling of 
its insufficiency caught blindly in the spell of art, to which art’s own truth 
content is opposed” (121).   
 
 The better an artwork is understood, the more puzzled it is and the more obscure 
its enigmaticalness becomes. The word ‘enigma’ that Adorno uses is not a glib synonym 
for ‘problem’; artworks are problems that also contain their solutions in them. Every 
artwork is an enigma and ripens in creating a problem that has potential for solution but 
the solution is not given objectively. Artworks are vexations that for the observer to 
route. In his phenomenological circle, Adorno puts it this way: 
“If a work opens itself completely, it reveals itself as a question and 
demands reflection: then the work vanishes into the distance, only to 
return to those who thought they understood it, overwhelming them for a 
second time with the question “What is it?”” (121).   
 
  Adorno relates this enigmaticalness to the longing that the artworks endure. In 
fact, there is no artwork that can exist without longing. They transcend this longing by 
the neediness of their historical existence. They are not for-itself of consciousness but 
in-itself in want of an other; “the artwork is language of this wanting and the artwork’s 
content [Gehalt] is as substantial as this wanting” (132). This is why, Adorno calls for 
the doctrine of imitation to be reversed: “Ultimately the doctrine of imitation should be 
reversed: in a sublimated sense, reality should imitate artworks” (132).  
Then, in a surprising manner, Adorno tries to describe the ‘being of an artwork’ 
as ‘becoming’.  
“The artwork is a process essentially in the relation of its whole and parts. 
Without being reducible to one side or the other, it is the relation itself 
that is a process of becoming. Whatever may in the artwork be called 
totality is not a structure that integrates the sum of its parts. Even 
objectified the work remains a developing process by virtue of the 
propensities active in it.” (my italics and underline - 178).  
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 The parts are not pre-given to be the centers of energy that strain toward the 
whole. This is, also, the failure of history’s verdict that asks for the unity of process and 
meaning. If an artwork is not fixed but a “becoming in motion”, then the communication 
of the whole and its parts develop “in time”, and therefore, can still keep the tendency to 
perish in the history. “If artworks are alive in history by virtue of their own processual 
character, they are also able to perish in it” (178). Though, Adorno warns that it is not 
the individual reactions towards the works that keep them changing. Such change is 
external to what transpires in them in the process of the unforeseeable dissolution of 
their layers due to their “emerging and increasingly distinct law of form”, “the 
petrifaction of works that have become transparent” and “their falling silent” (178). 
 Artworks are both the result of the process and the process itself at a standstill. 
They are closed on one another, blind and yet in their hermeticism they represent what is 
external. This interpretation as the result of a process at a standstill approximates the 
thesis of monadological character of artworks. However, this thesis is also problematic 
for Adorno, for it leads to their immanent analysis inherited and developed in academic 
tradition. The monadological constitution of artworks always points themselves beyond 
themselves.  
“If it is made absolute, immanent analysis falls prey to ideology, against 
which it struggled when it wanted to devote itself to the artworks 
internally rather than deducing their worldviews. Today it is already 
evident that immanent analysis, which was once a weapon of artistic 
experience against philistinism, is being misused as a slogan to hold 
social reflection at a distance from an absolutized art. Without social 
reflection, however, the artwork is not to be understood in relation to that 
of which it constitutes one element, nor is it to be deciphered in terms of 
its own content. The blindness of the artwork is not only a corrective of 
the nature-dominating universal, it is also its correlative; as always the 
blind and the empty belong together in their abstractness” (180).         
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In that abstractness, their spirit arises. However, their content is posited by their 
structure, it is not something added from outside. Their spirit necessarily appears as 
something in-itself and along with the objectivity of their spirit, they become something 
made. This reflection of them through their spirit is what is responsible for their fetish 
character. To this extent then, something art-alien, which art senses, is added to their 
structure. They organize what is not organized. This is their paradox; “[…] though they 
are dynamic themselves, they are fixated, whereas it is only by being fixated that they 
are objectivated” (184). That is, also, the system of irreconcilables that they are 
considered to be by Adorno; the more insistently they are observed, the more 
paradoxical they become.  
 The mimetic impulses that motivate the artwork fragile are that they are 
speechless expression. It is here that one can purport another resemblance of the 
muteness that Benjamin allies to nature and of the muteness that Adorno allies to 
artworks as fragments of nature. “They only become language through their 
objectivation as art. In art’s intentionless language, the mimetic impulses are bequeathed 
to the whole, which synthesizes them” (184). By their spiritual mediation, they enter into 
a contradictory relation, but at the same time, they, also, try to solve this contradiction. 
Their dynamism is inherited by what speaks in them; through spiritualization, they attain 
the mimetic impulses that their spirit subjugates. Although, the reference word 
‘constellation’ is never used here, Adorno, as is well known, in accordance with the 
concept of constellation that he takes from Benjamin, says that; “The [mimetic] elements 
are not arranged in juxtaposition but rather grind away at each other or draw each other 
in: the one seeks or repulses the other” (brackets are my addition - 184).    
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 The material unity of artworks are all the more illusory, the more its forms and 
elements are topoi and do not emerge from the complexion of the individual work. This 
is where, Adorno finds one aspect of the opposition of modern artworks; that is: their 
insistence on the real unity of unreal whence it no longer has a tolerance of universality 
in an unreflected immediacy.  
“That the unity of the work does not, however, completely originate in 
the work’s individual impulses is not due simply to how these impulses 
are manipulated. Semblance is defined by these impulses as well. While 
gazing longingly and needingly toward the unity they could fulfill and 
reconcile, they always at the same time flee from it. The prejudice of the 
idealist tradition in favor of unity and synthesis has neglected this. Unity 
is motivated not least of all by the fact that according to their own 
propensity the individual elements seek to escape it. Dispersed 
multiplicity does not offer itself neutrally to aesthetic synthesis as does 
epistemology’s chaotic material, which, devoid of quality, neither 
anticipates nor eludes its forming. In the unity of artworks is also 
inescapably the violence done to multiplicity –symptomatic of which is 
the use in aesthetic criticism of expressions such as “mastery over the 
material”- multiplicity must, like the ephemeral and alluring images of 
nature in antiquity’s myths fear unity. The unity of logos, because it 
mutilates, is enmeshed in the nexus of its guilt” (186). 
   
 Moreover and yet, this unity is not binding; “an element of this bindingness is 
probably what is binding in all artworks” (187). As soon as unity becomes stable, it is 
already lost. Later, Adorno rigorously collaborates with the question of intensity to the 
extent that the unity and multiplicity internal to artworks can be grasped. For Adorno, 
intensity is mimesis achieved through unity and ceded by the multiplicity to the totality, 
although this totality is never immediately present as an intensive force; the power of the 
whole is accumulated in the details. Even in many of its elements, artworks become 
more intense and thicker and gives the impression of being an end in itself; the unities of 
composition and construction seem to exist only for the purpose of such an intensity. 
“Acordingly”, says Adorno, “contrary to current aesthetic views, the whole in truth exist 
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for the sake of its part -that is, its instant- and not the reverse; what works in opposition 
to mimesis ultimately seeks to serve it” (187).  
 To diverge about what has been said previously about the ‘true artworks’, only 
which have the power to destroy their own spirit, Adorno says that what is corrective in 
the fact is that there are no perfect works. “If they did exist, reconciliation would be 
possible in the midst of the unreconciled, to which realm art belongs” (190). In the 
unreconciled fragment of art, the rank of an artwork is defined essentially whether it 
exposes itself to or withdraws itself from the irreconcilable, otherwise, in perfect 
artworks, art would transcend its own concept, would want to be what it is not and 
nevertheless would want to be. Even in the formal aesthetics, there is always a wish of 
return to the content [Inhalt] refracted by their own law, otherwise, the dialectic of their 
form that implies depth would be ‘empty play’ as the philistine demand establishes. “Yet 
depth is not to be equated with the abyss of subjective inwardness, which is said to yawn 
wide in artworks; rather, it is an objective category of works; the clever chatter about the 
superficiality of depth is as sophistic as it is solemn praise” (190).   In the superficial 
artworks, synthesis does not intervene in the heterogeneous elements to which it refers 
but rather runs parallel with them.  
“Those works are deep that neither mask the divergent or antagonistic nor 
leave it unreconciled. By forcing it into appearance that issues from the 
unreconciled, they incorporate the possibility of conciliation. Giving form 
to antagonisms does not reconcile or eliminate them. By appearing and 
determining all labor in the artwork, they become something essential; by 
becoming thematic in the aesthetic image, their substantiality emerges 
with all the more plasticity” (190).  
 
 This is why Adorno finds the deepest antinomy of artworks as their 
irreconcilability by way of reconciliation where their constitutive irreconcilability at the 
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same time deprives them of reconciliation, too. Thus, what determines the rank or 
quality of an artwork is its historical articulation. History is immanent to artworks, not 
an external fate or fluctuating estimation. The articulated truth content objectivated by 
history is the correct consciousness in the artworks always forces them for the possible 
reconciliation. “Their truth content is unconscious writing of history bound up with what 
has been repeatedly vanquished”(192). Articulation is redemption of the many in the one 
that always works for the one. For artistic praxis, articulation means that for every 
specific form, the idea must be driven to its extremity. “The more articulated the work, 
the more its idea becomes eloquent; mimesis receives succor from its counterpole” 
(191). This pushes Adorno to say that; “The degree to which aesthetic unity is itself a 
function of multiplicity is evident in works that out of abstract enmity to unity seek to 
dissolve themselves into the multiplicitious, to renounce that whereby the differentiated 
becomes something differentiated in the first place. Works that are absolutely in flux, 
whose plurality is without reference to unity, thereby become undifferentiated, 
monotonous and indifferent” (191). Thus their fluxing transformation cannot be 
prevented by their fixation in stone or canvas. What is fixated is a sign, a function and 
not something-in-itself; “the process between what has been fixated and the spirit is the 
history of works. If each work is a condition of equilibrium, each may yet once again 
enter into motion. The elements of the equilibrium are irreconcilable with each other. 
The development of artworks is the afterlife of their immanent dynamic” (193). What 
the artworks say ultimately affects their truth content. They may become mute, their 
quality may suffer and they may collapse into ideology, the extension of which is 
usually reckoned in the guarantee of survival in the neutralization of culture as a 
‘reserve’. This is why, for Adorno, levels of form must be maintained.  If works when 
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finished become what they are, it is because “their being is a process of becoming” 
(194). Their relation to past, for Adorno, today finds its repercussions in consciousness 
either in positive or negative transcendence; “the rest is nothing more than empty 
erudition” (194). The opposite of a genuine relation to the historical substance of 
artworks as their ‘essential content’ trembles as a rash into the subsumption to history, 
their assignment to a historical moment. However, Adorno’s ‘hope’ still endures; “only 
a liberated, reconciled humanity will someday perhaps be able to devote itself to the art 
of past without ignominy, without that famous rancor at contemporary art, and thus 
make amends to the dead” (194).  In his search for the quality of artworks, what Adorno 
maintains is that artworks can only become what they are when unfolded historically; 
that is, when related to what came afterward and what preceded them, because Adorno 
perhaps finds a relation between quality and the process of perishing. Where that quality 
is found, for Adorno, is the aesthetic form of the sublime. The sublime that Kant had 
defined and reserved as nature has later turned into the arts and crafts. Kant has 
considered art as a servant. Art becomes human at the moment it serves for history. 
However, this is the moment when it also turns into ideology for Adorno; “it is loyal to 
humanity only through inhumanity toward it” (197).  The sublime to be felt in the face 
of nature anticipates reconciliation with nature. Even in Kant’s formulation, it was 
tinged that in the face of sublime, man was to face his own nothingness and the fragile 
empirical individual who has to stand firm against death, was to negate this annihilation 
to transcend everything in his universal destiny to become absolute so that his spirit 
would be able to unfold. However, maintains Adorno; “He becomes comical. Advanced 
art writes the comedy of the tragic: Here the sublime and play converge” (198). Still 
Adorno cannot leave off Kant totally and establishes that there was something that resist 
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the objection that Kant reserved, because he has not yet been able to experience the great 
subjective art.  
Nevertheless, unwittingly, Kant’s doctrine of the sublime expresses that the 
sublime is incompatible with the semblance character of art. Yet, the idea that the 
sublime as semblance reserves its own absurdity and contributes to the neutralization of 
truth, for what is ever presented as evidence toward the subjective aesthetic experience 
is that the feelings are illusory. “Yet the feelings are real; the semblance is a quality of 
the aesthetic objects” (199). With his unquestioning of the concept of sublime but by just 
giving its definition as the ‘purposiveness of purposelessness’, he also succumbed to the 
complicity of domination, which just led to the setting up of the categories of powerful 
and powerlessness. The feeling of sublime does no correspond immediately with what 
appears; 
“The legacy of the sublime is unassuaged negativity, as stark and 
illusionless as was once promised by the semblance of the sublime. This 
is however at the same time the legacy of the comic, which was always 
nourished by a feeling for the diminutive, the ludicrously pompous and 
insignificant and which, for the most part, shored up established 
domination. The nonentity is comic by the claim to relevance that it 
registers by its mere existence and by which it takes the side of its 
opponent; one seen through, however, the opponent –power, grandeur- 
has itself become a nonentity. Tragedy and comedy perish in modern art 
and preserve themselves in it as perishing” (199). 
 
  Although, all through his own preservations of the spirit of imagination against 
the annihilation felt in the face of sublime, Adorno, for the most part seems too ‘naive’.  
Since the dialectical figuration of artworks is a procedure that Adorno cannot leave off, 
at the moment when he ever talks about the process of the becoming of artworks, he can 
only cope them in the form of ‘time’.  Although Adorno’s motives, like Benjamin starts 
to save the content of language (of artworks) from the tyranny of the speculative 
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contemplation, to suspend their understandability in an enigmaticalness, without 
constituting a dialectics of content and form (even at the risk constructing a separation 
between Inhalt and Gehalt), a process of becoming in the historical timeliness of 
perishing and transience, in short, without grounding the determinateness of the 
indeterminable, Adorno, himself cannot make philosophy.  This is for Deleuze, the 
biggest mistake of philosophy; “the history of the long error is the history of 
representations, the history of icons” (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 301).  
   
3.2. Affirmation of the Excess: Deleuze’s discourse on Mimesis and Art  
3.2.1. Image of Thought and Plane of Immanence  
 
A concept in philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari defines it, is a “fragmentary 
whole” (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? 35). The philosophy that introduces 
them always creates “a powerful Whole, while remaining open, is not fragmented” (35). 
This Whole can be considered as “a table, a plateau or a slice […] the plane of 
consistency, the plano-menon” (35). The plane of immanence, though, should not be 
confused with the Whole that always includes all concepts.  
“The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but 
rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it 
means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought. 
It is not a method, since every method is concerned with concepts and 
presupposes such an image. Neither is it a state of knowledge on the brain 
and its functioning, since thought here is not related to the slow brain as 
the scientifically determinable state of affairs in which, whatever its use 
and orientation, though is only brought about. Nor is it opinions held 
about thought, about its forms, ends and means, at a particular moment” 
(37).  
 
Since philosophy, for Deleuze and Guattari, is always a constructivism, it has 
two “qualitatively different” aspects: (i) the creation of concepts and (ii) the laying out 
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of a plane (36). The plane of immanence secures the conceptual linkages and concepts 
populate the plane with variable curves.  
For Deleuze and Guattari, contemplating, reflecting or communicating are 
anything more than opinions held about thought at a particular time and in a particular 
civilization. 
 What constitutes the image of thought by rightful claims of thought is the 
infinite movement or the movement of the infinite. The movement of the infinite does 
not refer to spatiotemporal coordinates; the positions of a moving object, that 
experiences itself a subject from an objective, fixed reference point as the famous phrase 
‘to orientate oneself in thought’ would imply. “Movement takes in everything, and there 
is no place for a subject and an object that can only be concepts. It is the horizon itself 
that is in movement: the relative horizon recedes when the subject advances, but on the 
plane of immanence we are always and already on the absolute horizon” (38). Infinite 
movement advances by coming and going and always moves back on itself. Infinite 
movement is double, “and there is always a fold from one to other. It is in this sense that 
thinking and being are said to be one and the same. Or rather, movement is not the 
image of thought without being also the substance of being” (38).  
The image of thought has two facets; (i) Thought/Nous and (ii) Nature/Physis. 
Because of these two facets, many infinite movements fold in each other so that the 
plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven. Even the negative, losing one’s way 
while ‘turning away’, falling into error as much as avoiding it, springing passions while 
trying overcome them, these diverse and complex movements of the infinite, far from 
breaking the One-Whole of the plane of immanence works in benefit of its variable 
curvatures. These curves make the fractal character of the plane of immanence 
 56
(planomenon) infinitely different than every concept, turning back on itself, folding 
itself, allowing itself to be folded by them and creating retroaction, connections etc. The 
plane of immanence is always single but not the same in Greeks, in seventeenth century 
or today and neither is the image of thought or substance of being is the same. The plane 
is made the object of an infinite specification that the One-All is selected by movement.  
However, in reality, elements of the plane are diagrammatic features, whereas 
concepts are intensive features. The diagrammatic features of the plane are movements 
of the infinite, directions fractal in nature; whereas the intensive features of the concepts 
are finite movements in which the infinite is the speed that keeps the volume. All of the 
metaphysical philosophemes that entail the development of the system on ‘intuition’ is 
justified if intuition is an envelop of infinite movements that constantly pass through the 
plane of immanence. However, the concepts are separated from the plane; in fact, they 
are distinctively constructed from the plane during when the plane is set up.  
Since philosophy begins with the creation of concepts, then the plane of 
immanence may be regarded as prephilosophical wherein this state of being 
prephilosophical must not be understood as something preexistent to but rather 
“something that does not exist outside philosophy” (41). This is how Adorno writes his 
works, first constructing a pre-philosophical plane (the plane of immanence) from which 
he always derives or rather ‘makes his own way’ out of these. The principle of 
equivalence, cunning, barter are the concepts of the plane of immanence 
(‘enlightenment’) that they construct.  
Concepts refer to a nonconceptual understanding in variance to the way the plane 
is constructed. Examples are; Descartes’s subjective understanding presupposed by ‘I 
think’, Plato’s virtual image (eidos) that doubles up everything as being already-thought, 
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Heidegger’s preontological understanding of being. Through the internal conditions of 
being prephilosophical (that, eventually, means nothing exists outside of philosophy), 
Deleuze and Guattari finds the nonphilosophical to be closer to the heart of philosophy 
and thus is also addressed to nonphilosophers as well. The concept is the creation of 
philosophy but the plane is its institution. Both the concepts and the plane are always 
required since the plane “is clearly not a program, design, end or means: it is a plane of 
immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or 
deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts” (41).  
The plane of immanence is a section of chaos and acts like a sieve, where chaos 
cannot just be explained by the absence of determinations but by the infinite speed. 
Chaos is not an inert, stationary state or chance mixture but undoes every consistency in 
the infinite impossibility of disconnection of one determination to the other, since all the 
determinations always appear in the disappearance of another one. The aim of 
philosophy is to have consistency without losing the infinite plane. Science determines 
chaos by defining it in coordinates, however, philosophy proceeds by implying the plane 
of immanence whose variable curves constitute the infinite movements turning back on 
themselves in incessant exchange.  
Deleuze and Guattari, then, makes their reference to the Greekness of 
philosophy, If this plane/sieve is called the Logos, then the reason appended to it is not 
simple because it is a very impoverished concept that defines the plane. “In short, the 
first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieved stretched 
over the chaos”(43).  
The question that Deleuze and Guattari impose is whether the entire history of 
philosophy could be presented from the viewpoint of plane of immanence. A plane of 
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confusion and concepts always occurs when immanence is trying to be made immanent 
“to” something, “so that the concepts become a transcendent universal and the plane 
becomes an attribute in the concept. When understood in this way, the plane of 
immanence revives the transcendent again: “it is a simple field of phenomena that now 
only possesses in a secondary way that which first of all is attributed to the transcendent 
unity” (44-5).    
Although it is not very clear why immanence is so dangerous (engulfing gods 
and sages) but nevertheless determines the philosopher by the part played out by itself,  
immanence “[…] is immanent only to itself and consequently captures everything, 
absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent. In any 
case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, we can be sure that 
this Something reintroduces the transcendent” (45).  The treat of plane of immanence as 
field of consciousness starts with Descartes, following Kant and Husserl, where 
immanence is supposed to be immanent to a pure consciousness, to a thinking subject. 
Kant calls it ‘transcendental’ rather than ‘transcendence’ to make it a field of experience 
where nothing, the external as well as the internal escapes. “Kant objects to any 
transcendent use of synthesis, but he ascribes immanence to the subject of synthesis as 
new, subjective unity” (46). Thus, he can refine himself the luxury of denouncing 
transcendent Ideas, to make them the ‘horizon’ of immanent to the subject. “But in 
doing so, Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the 
transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but 
that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to self 
that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection)” (46).  
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When immanence is ever made immanent to a subjectivity, the action of 
immanence is turned “to another self, to another consciousness” (47). This is what 
Deluze calls as ‘communication’. Husserl and his followers discover in the Flesh or in 
the Other, the spy of the transcendent within immanence. Husserl evaluates immanence 
as “the flux lived by subjectivity” (47). However, this untamed flux, as is known, does 
not belong to the self, but something that is reestablished on the horizon of 
nonbelongings; (i) in the immanent or primordial world of intentional objects (ii) as the 
privileged transcendence of an intersubjective world by other selves (iii) objective 
transcendence of an ideal world of cultural formations and human community. 
In this ‘modern’ moment, immanence is not satisfied by thinking immanence to a 
transcendent, “we want to think transcendence with the immanent, and it is from 
immanence that a breach is expected ” (original italics, 47). We are not satisfied by 
tooling over immanence to the transcendent, we want it to be discharged, be reproduced 
and fabricated. And in its easiness, all that is required is “for movement to be stopped. 
Transcendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped. It takes advantage 
of interruption to reemerge, revive, and spring forth again” (original italics, 47).   
Deleuze defines three sorts of Universals –contemplation, reflection and 
communication- to the three eras of philosophy –Eidetic, Critical and 
Phenomenological- but are “inseparable from the long history of an illusion. The 
reversal of values had to go so far –making us think that immanence is a prison 
(solipsism) from which the Transcendent will save us” (47). When immanence is 
decaled to be anything other than itself, the right to speak of immanence is established. 
This plane does represent a flux that is immanent to a subject who belongs to itself but 
presents only events of possible worlds as concepts and other people (those that do not 
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belong to the subject) as expressions of possible worlds or conceptual personae. The 
‘event’ does not relate the lived to transcendence where subject belongs to the self, but 
on the contrary, is related to immanent survey of a field without a subject. Empiricism 
knows only events and other people and as a greater creator of concepts, it defines the 
habitus of the subject; “a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of 
saying I” (48).     
This plane is full of illusions. When we approach ourselves to the plane of 
immanence, to the absolute horizon (and it is indeed necessary in some part at least) that 
the illusions arise from the plane itself. There are four illusions: (i) illusion of 
transcendence: makes immanence immanent ‘to’ something and discovers the 
transcendence in the immanence; (ii) illusion of universals: confuses the concepts with 
the plane, necessitates the ‘something’ to which the immanence is attached and makes us 
think that the universal explains everything where else at first hand, it is itself that must 
be explained; therefore ensues a triple illusion: contemplation, reflection or 
communication; (iii) Illusion of the eternal: takes place when the concepts in need of 
creation are forgotten; (iv)Illusion of discursiveness: takes place when propositions are 
confused with the plane.  
However, the reason why the history of philosophy puts forward so many and  
different planes, ‘each’ restoring transcendence is not due to the variety of illusions  
but due to the reason of each of them offering their own way of constructing  
immanence. “Each plane carries out a selection of that which is due to thought by  
right, but this selection varies from one plane to another. Every plane of immanence is  
a One-All: it is not partial like a scientific system, or fragmentary like concepts, but  
distributive – it is an ‘each’. The plane of immanence is interleaved.” (original  
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quotations and italics, WIP 50) 
It is not the variety of planes that matter but the way in which they are 
distributed. Otherwise, we would have the same image of thought from pre-Socratics to 
Heraclitus and Parmenides or from Plato to Descartes. It is always the question of 
multiplicity or oneness of the plane. “In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out 
a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new 
image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers on the same plane? 
[…] When we find several philosophies in the same author, is it not because they have 
changed plane and once more found a new image?” (WIP 51).  
There are also those philosophers (Deleuze and Guattari call them 
‘functionaries’) who do not construct a new plane of immanence and unaware of the 
model. But how can a new philosopher construct his/her new plane of immanence when 
its layers sometimes knit together and sometimes separate? “That is why every plane is 
not only interleaved but holed, letting through the fogs that surround it, and in which the 
philosopher who laid it out is in danger of being the first to lose himself” (51).  
This promiscuity is explained in two clusters; (i) thought is unable to stop itself from  
interpreting immanence as immanent to something, the great Object of contemplation, 
the Subject of reflection or the Other subject of communication; and within this 
transcendence always gets infixed inevitably, (ii) the unavoidability of transcendence is 
introduced because the plane has a claim of itself being unique; ‘being the plane’. 
Therefore, the whole choice is always between the chaos and transcendence.  
In the classical image of thought, it is the confidence of “willing” (52) turned 
towards truth that maintains the relationship of the infinite movement of knowledge as 
diagrammatic feature.What changes from one plane of immanence to another is not the 
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positive or negative features but also the ambiguous features that threaten thought with 
the danger of becoming increasingly numerous. Every modern image of thought is 
always in horror. “No image of thought can be limited to a selection of calm 
determinations and all of them encounter something that is abominable in principle, 
whether this be the error into which thought continually falls, or the illusion within 
which it continually turns, or the stupidity in which it continually wallows, or the 
delirium in which it continually turns away from itself or from a god” (54). The Greek 
image of thought has established this by invoking “the madness of double turning-away” 
(54) that fling into infinite wandering. The first characteristic of the modern image of 
thought is to complete the relationship of truth as a creation of thought and all the 
positive or negative features of the plane of immanence.  
It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not 
succeed in thinking it. “Is there a “best” plane that would not hand over immanence to 
Something = x and that would no longer mimic anything transcendent? We will say that 
THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that 
which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought” (58). It is the most 
intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside – an outside more distant than any 
external world because it is an inside deeper than any internal world.  
“It is immanence: intimacy as the Outside, the exterior become the 
intrusion that stifles and the reversal of both the one and the other” – the 
incessant to-ing and fro-ing of the plane, infinite movement. “Perhaps 
this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of 
immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and to 
think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the non-
external outside and the not-internal inside – that which cannot be 
thought and yet must be thought, which was thought once, as Christ was 
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incarnated once, in order to show, that one time, the possibility of the 
impossible” (WIP 59-60). 
 
3.2.2. Difference for Itself and Repetition in Itself  
Deleuze suggests Plato’s thought to be turned upon a particularly important 
central distinction: the distinction between the original and the image and between the 
model and copy. The model is always to enjoy a spontaneous superiority because it is 
nothing other than what it is; whereas the copy is judged in terms of a derived internal 
resemblance. This is, in fact, when the difference is ever integrated into the system. 
Difference can only be understood in terms of comparative play of the two similitudes: 
the exemplary similitude of an identical original and the imitative similitude of a more 
or less accurate copy. Since difference is behind everything and there is nothing behind 
difference, each term of a series of differences, itself being only a difference, must be 
put into a variable relation with other terms, thereby constituting other series devoid of 
centre and convergence. For Deleuze, the prefix RE- in the word representation signifies 
this conceptual form of the identical which subordinates differences. The test imbrued to 
determine among the claimants, to haunt down the phantasms and simulacra has always 
been the task of philosophy. “The function of the notion of the model is not to oppose 
the world of images in its entirety but to select the good images, the icons which 
resemble from within and eliminate the bad images or simulacra. Platonism as a whole is 
erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down the phantasms or simulacra which are 
identified with the Sophist himself, that devil, that insinuator or simulator, that always 
disguised and displaced false pretender” (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 127). 
Moreover, this test takes place not between the original and the image but rather 
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between two kinds of images [idoles], of which [copies] are only the first kind, the other 
being simulacra [phantasmes]. The copies are always to be determined. To determine 
them is ‘to make philosophy’. Copies are selected, justified and saved in the name of 
identity and their internal resemblance to the ideal model. Then for Plato, the 
determination of the images are due to subordinating difference to the supposedly initial 
powers of the Same and the Similar, and declaring the difference unthinkable in itself 
along with simulacra and sending it to the “bottomless ocean” of the model (127).The 
four figures of the Platonic dialectic are therefore: the selection of difference, the 
installation of a mythic circle, the establishment of a foundation and the position of a 
question-problem complex. Plato has given the establishment of difference as the 
supreme goal of dialectic. Things, themselves, are simulacra, which, in turn, are the 
superior forms and the danger involved in everything is to become their own simulacra. 
In the playoff of determination/subordination, before the deployment of the constituted 
logic of representation, what is installed first is a moral vision of the world; what 
Deleuze in other words calls as ‘the image of thought’. This is a world that only Plato 
(the philosopher king) can make based upon his moral intuition. For Deleuze, this image 
of thought can be called a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image. This image is borrowed 
from the pure element of common sense. The philosopher derives his pre-philosophical 
presuppositions from this natural image of thought. Many philosophers have already 
started with the presuppositions of ‘I think’ and ‘everybody knows’ assuming that 
everybody really knows what it means to think and to know. In such an interlocution, the 
universal recognition of the philosopher and the good will on his part and an upright 
nature on his thought is implied. So that philosophy can start with the common sense as 
Cogitatio natura universalis. According to this image, thought has a pre-established 
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affinity with true, possesses and materially wants the true. “Thereafter, it matters little 
whether philosophy begins with the object and the subject, with beings or Being, as long 
as thought remains subject to this image which already prejudges everything: the 
distribution of the object and subject as well as that of Being and beings” (131). This is 
what we see with Adorno. Every time he thinks with his good will, he can make 
philosophy. This is why Adorno can never leave Hegel and the thought of carrying 
contradictions. In fact, what is contradictory is his ‘reservation’ and ‘ground’ of Hegel’s 
dialectics as not being able to solve the crisis of modernity, and moreover, even as an 
adversary, he had multiplied them.      
For Deleuze, ideas are already multiplicities. In this usage of the word 
‘multiplicity’, the utmost importance must be attached to the substantive form: 
multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many as such, which has no need 
whatsoever of unity in order to form a system. Multiplicity, which replaces the one no 
less than the many, is the true substantive, substance itself. Everything is a multiplicity 
as long as it incarnates an Idea. An Idea is an n-dimensional, continuous, defined 
multiplicity.  
“That the one is a multiplicity is enough to reject back-to-back adjectival 
propositions of the one-many and many-one type. Everywhere the 
differences between multiplicities and the differences within 
multiplicities replace schematic and crude oppositions. Instead of the 
enormous opposition between the one and the many, there is only the 
variety of multiplicity, even the one, even the many, there is only the 
variety of multiplicity – in other words, difference. It is, perhaps, ironic to 
say that everything is multiplicity, even the one, even the many. 
However, irony itself is a multiplicity” (182).  
 
 There are three conditions which together allow us to define the moment at 
which an Idea as an n-dimensional multiplicity emerges: (i) the elements of multiplicity 
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must have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification, nor, therefore, any 
assignable function. They are not even actually existent, but inseparable from a potential 
or a virtuality. This is why, they imply no prior identity, no positing of a something that 
could be called one or the many. On the contrary, their indetermination renders possible 
the manifestation of difference freed from all subordination. (ii) These elements must, in 
fact, be determined, but reciprocally, by reciprocal relations which allow no 
independence whatsoever to subsist. Such relations are precisely non-localizable ideal 
connections, whether they characterize the multiplicity globally or proceed by the 
juxtaposition of neighboring regions. In all cases, the multiplicity is intrinsically 
defined, without external reference or recourse to a uniform space in which it would be 
submerged. Spatio-temporal relations no doubt retain multiplicity, which they replace 
by the identity of an ‘I think’ or something thought. However, internal multiplicity is a 
characteristic of the Idea alone. (iii) A multiple ideal connection, a differential relation, 
must be actualized in diverse spatio-temporal relationships, at the same time as its 
elements are actually incarnated in a variety of terms and forms. The Idea is defined as a 
structure. A structure or an Idea is a ‘complex theme’, an internal multiplicity – in other 
words, a system of multiple, non-localisable connections between differential elements 
which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms.   
 Deleuze dissects an Idea into two components: one encases the virtual and the 
real, while the other encases the actual and the possible. The determination of the virtual 
content of an Idea is called differentiation and the actualization of that virtuality into 
species and parts is called differenciation. For Ideas to be actualized, they have to be 
differenciated. In themselves, they remain completely undifferenciated, but determinate 
and differentiated. However, the attention must be paid to the totality of the system 
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which brings the Idea into play: the (indi)-different/ciation. It is as if everything has two 
dissimilar halves. This is how Deleuze understands the individuation; with its two 
dissimilar halves. However, this implementation is inscribed in order to save the Other 
from any physic systems. The Other is not reducible to the individuating factors 
implicated in the system, but it is made subject to representation and stand for them it in 
a certain sense. “That the Other should not, properly speaking, be anyone, neither you 
nor I, signifies that it is a structure which is implemented only by variable terms in 
different perceptual worlds – me for you in yours, you for me in mine. It is not even 
enough to see in the Other a specific or particular structure if the perceptual world in 
general: in fact, is a structure which grounds and ensures the overall functioning of this 
world as a whole. Notions necessary for the description of this world – such as those of 
form-ground, profile-unity of the object, depth-length, horizon-focus – would remain 
empty and inapplicable if the Other were not there to give expression to those possible 
worlds in which that which is (for us) in the background is pre-perceived or sub-
perceived as a possible form; that which is in depth as a possible length etc” (281). In 
other words, for Deleuze, Other should never be held phenomenal, which would always 
obtain it in representation or even in another representation to oppose the previous one.  
For Deleuze, neither difference nor repetition can be ‘thought’ in itself, for both 
of them are subject to mimesis. Both of them can only be thought when tamed under the 
four collars of representation: (i) identity in the concept (ii) opposition in the predicate 
(iii) analogy in judgment and (iv) resemblance in perception. “These are the four roots of 
the principle of reason: the identity of the concept which is reflected in ratio 
cognescendi; the opposition of the predicate which is developed in ratio fiendi; the 
analogy of judgment which is distributed in a ratio essendi; the resemblance of 
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perception which determines a ratio agendi” (262). Through these principles, the 
philosophy can erect its ultimate aim; to render representation infinite or orgiastic.  
It is a question of extending difference too large (Hegel) or too small (Leibniz). 
What happens with Hegel is that the representation conquers the infinite because the 
technique dealing with the infinitely small captures the smallest difference and its 
disappearance and the contradiction pushes back difference to the limit but solely in 
order to make identity the sufficient condition for difference to exist and to be thought; 
only in relation with the identical and as a function of the identical, contradiction is the 
greatest difference. What happens with Leibniz is that the representation may become 
infinite but it does not acquire the power to affirm the divergence or decentring but 
requires a convergent and monocentric world. The ground or the principle of sufficient 
reason is nothing but a means of allowing the identical rule over infinity itself, allowing 
the continuity of resemblance, the relation of analogy and the opposition of predicates to 
invade infinity.  
 It might be correct to define metaphysics by recourse to Platonism but what 
matters more is the question of distinction and decision. The primary distinction 
established by Plato is the one between the model (Idea) and the copy. However, more 
than just an appearance, copy has an internal and ontological relationship with the 
model. The more profound distinction is between the copy and the simulacra. Simulacra 
are always failed due to, both, the test of the copy and the requirements of the model. 
The Platonic wish to exorcize simulacra is what institutes the content of difference. The 
model is defined by a positioning of identity as the essence of the Same and the copy by 
an auto-affection of internal resemblance as the quality of the Similar. Because the 
resemblance is internal, the copy must have an internal relation with being, true and 
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goodness as analogous to the model. Finally the copy is constructed by means of a 
method (dialectics) which attributes to the requirements of the model.  
“In all these ways, copies are distinguished from simulacra only by 
subordinating difference to instances of the Same, the Similar, the 
Analogous and the Opposed. No doubt with Plato these instances are yet 
distributed as they will be in the deployed world of representation (from 
Aristotle onwards). Plato inaugurates and initiates because he evolves 
within a theory of Ideas which will allow the deployment of 
representation. In his case, however, a moral motivation in all its purity is 
avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation 
apart from the model. What is condemned in the simulacra is the state of 
free, oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchy, 
along with all that malice which challenges both the notion of the model 
and that of the copy. Later, the world of representations will more or less 
forget its moral origin and pressuppositions” (original italics - 265).      
   
 Representation is always a site of transcendental illusion which comes in four 
interrelated forms; thought, sensibility, the Idea and being. In effect, thought is covered 
up by an ‘image’ whose postulates distort its operation. These postulates culminate in 
the position of an identical thinking subject, which functions as a principle of identity for 
concepts ‘in general’, just as when the sameness of the Platonic model guaranteed by the 
Good and God, grounded as an originary concept in a thinking subject. Nevertheless, it 
is the moral vision of the world that is extended and presented in the subjective identity 
of common sense (Cogitatio natura universalis). “When difference is subordinated by 
the thinking subject to the identity of the concept (even where this identity is synthetic), 
difference in thought disappears. In other words, what disappears is that difference that 
thinking makes in thought, that geniality of thinking, that profound fracture of the I 
which leads it to think only in thinking its own passion, and even its own death, in the 
pure and empty form of time (original italics, my underline - 266). To restore difference 
in thought is to untie this first knot which consists of representing difference through the 
identity of the concept and the thinking subject”. The second concerns the subordination 
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of difference to resemblance. Given the matrix of unequal as the difference, resemblance 
needs no longer to be just between the copy and the model. It is determined when the 
diverse is made sensible to itself. Difference gets to be cancelled in the quality which 
covers it, while the inequality tends to be equalized within the extension in which it is 
distributed. However, difference is intensive, indistinguishable from depth in the 
spatium where there is neither extension nor qualification and can lie neither in the 
quality that covers it nor in the extension by which it is explicated. Intensity, for 
Deleuze, is not the sensible but the being of the sensible, where different relates to 
different. To untie the second knot, then, is the restore difference within intensity. The 
third illusion is the manner of the negative in which it subordinates difference in the 
form of limitation and opposition. The power of affirmation is betrayed by the figures of 
quantitative and qualitative limitation and opposition. Limitation and opposition are 
surface effects, where as depths are populated by differences without negation. The 
nature of the antinomies is as follows; once the nature of the problematic and the 
multiplicity which defines the Idea is misrecognised, once the Idea is reduced to the 
Same and to the identity of the concept, the negative occurs. However, for Deleuze, 
accepting that being is full positivity, and pure affirmation and undifferentiates the being 
without difference is to untie the third knot. The phrase “full positivity” means, here, 
positivity without any negation and “pure affirmation” as affirmation that is not the 
negation of negation to construe a synthetic unity. Thus, to restore the differential in the 
Idea as a problematic and let it remain as such until the pure affirmation flows from that 
restored difference is to break this holy bound. The fourth illusion is the subordination of 
difference to the analogy of judgment. Under the heading of the ultimate and primary 
concepts determined as indeterminate, the small and secondary concepts get started to be 
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constructed in terms of analogy. The difference of species and the large genera is the 
common example. However, it betrays the nature of difference. In terms of this 
distribution, the individual is rendered as that which bears difference in general and in 
fact, the greatest difference.     
 If difference is represented in the identical concept, repetition, by contrast, is 
represented outside the concept, as though it were a difference without a concept, but 
always with the presupposition of an identical concept. Thus, repetition occurs in 
numbers, that is, in space and time while, its concept remains the same. In the same 
movement, the identity of the concept in representation includes difference and is 
extended in repetition. Through this, repetition receives a negative explanation; it is a 
tool for explaining the possibility of differences without concept. Repetition, then, is 
explained in terms of relative limitation in our representation of the concept.  
“It (language) repeats because it (the words) is not real, because there is 
no definition other than nominal. It (nature) repeats because it (matter) 
has no interiority, because it is partes extra partes. It (the unconscious) 
repeats because it (the Ego) represses, because it (the Id) has no memory, 
no recognition and no consciousness of itself – ultimately because it has 
no instinct, instinct being the subjective concomitant of the species as 
concept” (original italics and parenthesis – 270-1).  
 
In short, things always repeat by virtue of what they are not or what they lack. 
Repetition, however, is not just related with the identical concept, it, also, represents it. 
In the classical dialectics, when the ultimate identity of the identical concepts fragments 
into multiplying instances of the same concept, the transcendental is fragmented into the 
materialization of the exterior matter and each fragment works for the sake of the whole 
(transcendental). That is why repetition is indistinguishable from matter understood as 
the fragmentation of the identical. Repetition, then, has a primary sense from the point of 
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view of representation, namely, the repetition of the same. This extrinsic model takes 
repetition as already accomplished and presents it to a spectator who contemplates it 
from without. Thus, it is still a sense understood in relation to a thought identity with the 
result that repetition remains a concept of reflection which ensures the transportation of 
the matter only within a representation and for a spectator who remains extrinsic.   
For Deleuze, we must distinguish two forms of repetition found in the Idea. 
  
“Repetition must be understood in the pronominal; we must find the Self of repetition, 
the singularity within that which repeats. For there is no repetition without a repeater, 
nothing repeated without a repetitious soul” (23). In every case repetition is difference 
without a concept. But in one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the 
concept; it is difference between objects represented by the same concept, falling into 
indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea; it 
unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to 
the Idea. The first repetition is the repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of 
the concept or representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the 
alterity of the Idea, in the heterogeneity of an ‘a-presentation’. In the center of the Idea 
lies the difference and the Same is only on the periphery. Repetition in the formless 
being of all differences is the formless power of the ground which carries every object to 
its extreme form in which its representation comes undone. The ultimate element of 
repetition is the disparate, which stands in opposition to the identity of representation. 
Thus, the circle of philosophy (of difference and repetition), which is tied to the Same, 
“is a tortuous circle in which Sameness is said only of that which differs” (57).   
In the great teaching of philosophy as omnis determinatio negatio, the 
philosophy of difference refuses the general alternative proposed by infinite 
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representation. Difference is seen as light, aerial and affirmative. To affirm is not to bear 
but, on the contrary, to discharge and to lighten. Negation is difference but difference 
seen from its underside, seen from below. “This proposition, however, means many 
things: that difference is an object of affirmation; that affirmation itself is multiple; that 
it is creation but also that it must be created, as affirming difference, as being difference 
itself” (DR 55). This is why, for Deleuze, it is not the negative, which is the motor of 
dialectic. Rather, there are differential elements that determine the genesis of both the 
affirmation and the affirmed difference. It is such that there is a genesis of affirmation 
that escapes us every time we put the determination in the negative. “Negation results 
from affirmation: this means that negation arises in the wake of affirmation or beside it, 
but only as the shadow of the more profound genetic element- of that power of ‘will’ 
which engenders the affirmation and the difference in the affirmation. Those who bear 
the negative know not what they do: they take the shadow for the reality, they encourage 
phantoms, they uncouple consequences from premises and they give epiphenomena the 
value of phenomena and essences” (original italics and quotation -DR 55).       
 Representation always fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. 
Representation has only one center and a false depth. It mediates everything but moves 
nothing. “Movement, for its parts, implies a plurality of centers, a superposition of 
perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments which essentially 
distort representation” (DR 56). Paintings and sculptures are already such ‘distortions’ 
for Deleuze, for they force us to create movement, which might be combining a 
superficial and a penetrating view or ascend and descend within the space as we move 
through them. Although infinite representation includes infinity of representation, it has 
a center which gathers and presents all the other representations and makes all moments 
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properties of the same Self. “The prefix RE- in the word representation signifies this 
conceptual form of the identical which subordinates differences” (DR 56). The 
immediate meditation of the Self, defines as ‘sub-representative’ by Deleuze, therefore 
is not attained by multiplying representations and points of view. On the contrary, 
proposes Deleuze that “each point of view must itself be the object, or the object must 
belong to the point of view” (DR 56). Thus difference must be shown differing. “Every 
object, every thing, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no 
more than a difference between differences” (DR 56).  
 
4. THE HETERO-TEXT WRITING ITSELF: 
 
 Jacques Derrida is also another critical theorist who has established an attitude 
against the ‘the thinking subject’. In his book ‘Of Grammatology’, he asks for a science 
of linguistics which does not work by negation as a positivist science, which does not 
swallow its ‘outside’ at the moment when produced by it. This position does not let 
Derrida to talk about a ‘simplicity of origins’. By naming his destruction of metaphysics 
‘deconstruction’, Jacques Derrida calls the entire western notion of ontophenomenology 
and structuralism logocentric and more specifically, by his criticism of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s general linguistics, he calls any or most theories of linguisticity phonocentric.     
 
4.1. Onto/Phenomeno/Typo/Ideo-logical Writing  
 
Within Jacques Derrida’s program, in the pushed order of the writing to 
comprehend the language as the ‘signifier of the signifier’, in its accidental doubling and 
fallen secondarity, writing has been determined in the entire history of language studies, 
as an origin, in presence under the privilege of phone. “The privilege of the phone does 
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not depend upon a choice that could have been avoided. It responds to a moment of 
economy (let us say of the “life” of “history” or of “being as self-relationship”). The 
system of “hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak” through the phonic substance – 
which presents itself as the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore nonempirical or 
noncontingent signifier- has necessarily dominated the history of the world during an 
entire epoch, and has even produced the idea of world, the idea of world-origin, that 
arises from the difference between worldly and the non-wordly, the outside and the 
inside, ideality and nonideality, universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical 
etc.” (original italics – Derrida, Of Grammatology 7-8). In the playful world of writing 
once it enters into the game of affecting all the signifieds, a limit has been achieved in 
our present era for Derrida; a limit of ‘overwhelming’. In the three millennia of the 
history of writing, the confinement of writing as a secondary and instrumental function 
has tended toward its own telos; the emergence of the spokesman as the translator of full 
speech –the interpreter of an originary speech, present to itself, presented by logos, to its 
signified, to the other and to the very condition of presence in general. Derrida does not 
simply mean technics or ache-technics allocated to speech (representation), nor does he 
really believe that any notion of technics can clarify the notion of writing. “It is therefore 
as if what we call language could have been in its origin and in its end only a moment, 
an essential but determined mode, a phenomenon, an aspect, a species of writing. And as 
if it had succeeded in making us forget this, and in willfully misleading us, only in the 
course of an adventure: as that adventure itself. All in all, a short enough adventure. It 
merges with the history that has associated technics and logocentric metaphysics for 
nearly three millennia. And it now seems to be approaching what is really its own 
exhaustion; under the circumstances – and this is no more than one example among 
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others- of this death of the civilization of the book, of which so much is said and which 
manifests itself particularly through a convulsive proliferation of libraries” (original 
italics – 8).   
In order to deconstruct such a narrow and reductionist approach towards writing, 
Derrida calls for an ‘interminable analysis’. All the metaphysical determinations of truth 
and signification are inseparable from the instance of logos or linked to a reason in the 
lineage of logos whether understood in the God’s infinite understanding, or Pre-Socratic, 
Pre-Hegealian or Post-Hegelian sense. Within these logoi, all through its history, the 
original and essential link has never been broken, perhaps, even from its first 
determination by Aristotle in his attachment of spoken words as mental experience and 
written words as the symbols of the spoken words. This is, for Derrida, the essentialist 
reason why “the voice, producer of first symbols, has a relationship of essential and 
immediate proximity with the mind” (11). As the producer of the first signifier, spoken 
words are not just any signifier among others, it signifies mental experiences which, 
then, reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance. Between being and mind, things 
and feelings, there would be a relationship of translation or natural signification; 
between mind and logos, a relationship of conventional symbolization. “And the first 
convention, which would relate immediately to the order of natural and universal 
signification, would be produced as spoken language. Written language would establish 
the conventions, interlinking other conventions with them” (11). In order to construct the 
stage of transparence, the feeling of mind - expressing things naturally- must constitute a 
sort of universal language which then should efface itself. Voice is always determined as 
closest to the signified and the written signifier is always technical, representative, has 
no constitutive meaning and is derivative with regard to what would wed the voice 
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indissolubly to the mind. “This derivation is the very origin of the notion of the 
“signifier”. The notion of sign always implies itself within the distinction between 
signifier and signified, even if, Saussure argues that they are distinguished simply as the 
two faces of one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within the heritage of 
that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: “absolute proximity of voice and 
being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning” (original 
quotations- 11-2). In such a determination, an entire system of phoneticization is 
constructed. The subject auto-affects itself and is related to itself by an element of 
ideality in the virtue of hearing (understanding)-oneself speak. Thus, this is what Derrida 
names as ‘logocentrism’, the determination of the being of entity as presence, “with all 
the subdeterminations which depend on this general form and which organize within it 
their system and their historical sequence (presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, 
presence as substance/essence/existence [ousia], temporal presence as [stigmé] of the 
now or of the moment [nun], the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, 
the co-presence of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional 
phenomenon of the ego, and so forth)” (12).  
The difference between the signified and the signifier or rather the strange 
separation of their parallelism belongs in an implicit way to the totality of the great 
epoch of the history of metaphysics and in a more explicit way to the narrower epoch of 
Christian creationism and infinitism with the resources of Greek conceptuality. This 
great history of metaphysics conceptualizes, first and before, all the distinction between 
the sensible and the intelligible, not as the only, but as the most chief distinction. Then, 
to this epoch belongs all the other metaphysico-theological roots.   
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“The semiological or, more specifically, linguistic “science” cannot 
therefore hold on to the difference between signifier and signified –the 
very idea of sign- without the difference between sensible and 
intelligible, certainly, but also not without retaining, more profoundly and 
more implicitly, and by the same token the reference to a signified able to 
“take place” in its intelligibility”, before its “fall”, before any expulsion 
into the exteriority of the sensible here below. As the face of pure 
intelligibility, it refers to an absolute logos to which it is immediately 
united. This absolute logos was an infinite creative subjectivity in 
medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward 
the word and the face of God” (13). 
 
Derrida does not simply reject these notions, and in fact, confesses that they are 
necessary and nothing further is ever possible without them. It is not even a question of 
simply opposing them but marking their conditions, surrounding their medium and the 
limit of their effectiveness and to designate the intimate relationship of the crevice of the 
machine whose deconstruction they permit. Knowing that to drag out the meaning out of 
the sign has been an agonized tradition of the history of metaphysics, Derrida states that 
“it is not a question of doing so in terms of the instance of truth, anterior, exterior or 
superior to the sign, or in terms of the place of the effaced difference. Quite the contrary. 
We are disturbed by that which, in the concept of the sign – which has never existed or 
functioned outside the history of (the) philosophy (of presence)- remains systematically 
and genealogically determined by that history. It is there that the concept and above all 
the work of deconstruction, its “style”, remain by nature exposed to misunderstanding 
and nonrecognition” (original quotation - 14). So far these words explicitly state out 
what Jacques Derrida has tried to name as ‘deconstruction’ and perhaps, further, extends 
the precautions of its misinterpretations.  
The exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing. In fact, there has 
never been a linguistic sign before writing, otherwise, the whole concept of language 
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would collapse. Derrida does not simply declare the end of the epoch to move onto 
something else. In this epoch, the reading and writing, the production or the 
interpretation of signs, “the text in general” has always been confined within 
secondariness. They have been preceded by a truth which is constituted by logos. “Even 
when the thing, the “referent”, is not immediately related to the logos of a creator God 
where it began by being the spoken/ thought sense, the signified has at any rate an 
immediate relationship with the logos in general (finite or infinite), and a mediated one 
with the signifier, that is to say, with the exteriority of writing. When it seems to go 
otherwise, it is because a metaphoric mediation has insinuated itself into the relationship 
and has simulated immediacy; the writing of truth in the soul, opposed by Phaedrus to 
bad writing (writing in the “literal” and ordinary sense, “sensible” writing, “in space”), 
the book of Nature and God’s writing, especially in the Middle Ages; all that functions 
as metaphor in these discourses confirms the privilege of the logos and founds the 
“literal” meaning then given to writing: a sign signifying a signifier itself signifying an 
eternal verity, eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logos” (original 
quotations - 15). The contradiction to which the attention should be given here, for 
Derrida, is that universal and natural writing, intelligible and nontemporal writing has 
been named by metaphor. A writing that is sensible is, thus, thought on the side of 
culture, technique and artifice, the ruse of a finite creature. As with the case of Platonic 
writing in the soul and its re-birth of rationalism in the seventeenth century, the writing 
has been understood in the metaphoric sense, as a ‘natural’, eternal, universal thing and 
the system of signified truth recognized in its dignity. The history of this metaphoricity 
is seen in the thematic of God’s book. The most decisive separation in the history of this 
treatment appears when the determination of absolute presence is constituted as self-
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presence, as subjectivity. From then on, we have its turn into another form, the 
denouncement into its opposition: the non-self-presence.    
In what Derrida calls as the “Rousseauist moment”, writing in the common sense 
is the dead letter, the carrier of death. It exhausts life. However, writing in the 
metaphorical sense, the natural, divine and living writing is ever venerated and therefore 
is immediately united to voice and to breath. In its repetitive gesture of Platonism, a 
question of choice is incurred between good and bad writing. The good (natural) writing 
is divine inscription in the heart and the soul while the perverse and artful writing is 
technique and exiled on the exteriority of the body. Therefore it is always the good 
writing that is comprehended by the subject; the beginning word is understood in the 
intimacy of self-presence, as the voice of the other and as commandment.  
The reassuring evidence that Derrida allocates to the Western tradition is: “the 
order of the signified is never contemporary, is at best the subtly discrepant inverse or 
parallel- discrepant by the time of a breath- from the order of the signifier. And the sign 
must be the unity of a heterogeneity, since the signified (sense or thing, noeme or 
reality) is not in itself a signifier, a trace: in any case is not constituted in its sense by its 
relationship with a possible trace” (18). When one submits oneself to the originary 
question “what is a sign?”, the inevitable response to receive is that the essence of the 
signified is presence and the privilege of its proximity to the logos as phoné is, in fact, 
the privilege of presence. “The “formal essence” of the sign can only be determined in 
terms of presence. One cannot get around that response, except by challenging the very 
form of the question and the beginning to think that the sign is that ill-named thing, the 
only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: “what is …?”” (original 
quotations – 19). For Derrida, Hegel has summed up the entire philosophy of logos, 
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while Heidegger, although trying to break it, has remained as a captive of it. Against the 
Aufhebung (which is the concept of history and teleology for Derrida), the case of the 
nonphonetic writing (which can be produced by deaf mutes) has been given by Leibniz. 
Hegel, of course, has criticized this writing because what it betrays is life, the breath, the 
spirit and the history as the sprit’s self-relationship with itself. “Cutting breath short, 
sterilizing or immobilizing spiritual creation in the repetition of the letter, in the 
commentary or the exegesis, confined in a narrow space, reserved for minority, it is the 
principle of death and of difference in the becoming of being” (25). Hegel, then, as the 
thinker of the irreducible and greatest difference or Leibniz as the thinker of the smallest 
difference, has always maintained writing as the reappropriation of difference, the 
retrieval of trace or the effacement of writing as absolute knowledge in the logos. Thus, 
what Derrida proposes as a science of science without sciencificity should be understood 
in the line that (as will be clearer later) a writing that is neither on the outside or in the 
inside defining a field of science. “The science of writing should therefore look for its 
object at the roots of scientificity. The history of writing should turn back toward the 
origin of historicity. A science of the possibility of science? A science of science which 
would no longer have the form of logic but that of grammatics? A history of the 
possibility of history which would no longer be an archaeology, a philosophy of history 
or a history of philosophy?” (28). The positivist and classical sciences of writing always 
repress this sort of question and hold this repression necessary for the benefit of the 
positive investigation. Derrida’s intention is not to weigh that somewhat facile and 
prejudicial question against the positivism that they hold, for many researches attached 
to that tradition already arranged around the problematics of beginning and end, that is 
to say, origin and definition.  
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For Jacques Derrida, the grammatologist that he proposes, least of all, should 
avoid asking the question of the essence of his object (word) in the form of origin. The 
question “what is writing?” inevitably will mean, “where and when has writing started?” 
And the answers usually come too quickly. “They circulate within concepts that are 
seldom criticized and move within evidence which always seems self-evident. It is 
around these responses that a typology of and a perspective on the growth of writing are 
always organized. All works dealing with the history of writing are composed along the 
same line: a philosophical and teleological classification exhausts the critical problems 
in a few pages; one passes next to an exposition of facts. We have a contrast between 
theoretical fragility of the reconstructions and the historical, archeological, ethnological, 
philosophical wealth of information” (28). Thus, the question of the origin of writing 
and the question of the origin are inseparable, according to Jacques Derrida. The main 
question that Derrida tries to allude is not just that grammatology has never asked for an 
assistance from linguistics that it has never looked for. In fact, for either better or worse 
or for productivity or blindness, it has been peacefully installed into the general science 
of writing as metaphysical presupposition to establish the link between speech and 
writing.  
Therefore, for Derrida, Saussure’s making a ‘general science’ of linguistics of 
sign, distinguished yet united, as signified and signifier and working in a differential 
system without positive terms and maintaining that writing is the sole figurative 
representation of language that is centrally phonetic, meaning that it is only sounds that 
constitute words which themselves are unity, refers, besides the culture/nature 
opposition, to a supervening opposition between physis and nomos, physis and techné 
and the ultimate aim of such a systematization recurs  “to derive historicity; and 
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paradoxically, not to recognize the rights of history, production, institutions etc., except 
in the form of the arbitrary and in the substance of naturalism” (original italics – 33).  If 
the word always implies other divisions until it predicts out the indivisible thought-
sound, then writing is constituted as phonetic, meaning that it is the outside, the exterior 
representation of language with the thought-sound at its centre and operates from the 
already constituted units of signification during the formation of which, it really has 
taken no part. Moreover, Derrida calls Saussure’s general science of linguistics a 
‘model’ rather than a structure, for it is functioning properly but in ideality, which 
explicitly directs a functioning that is not entirely phonetic, and thus inevitably leaks out.    
If writing is nothing but the figuration of language, then one has the right exclude 
it from the interiority of the system, which, surreptitiously, frames the inside of the 
system. For Derrida, to save the image without damage from the system of reality, 
Saussure proposes that writing is not related to the interiority of the system. 
“External/internal, image/reality, representation/presence, such is the old 
grid to which is given the task of outlining the domain of a science. And 
of what science? Of a science that can no longer answer to the classical 
concept of the episteme because the originality of its field –an originality 
that it inaugurates- is that the opening of the “image” within it, appears as 
the condition of “reality”; a relationship that can no longer be thought 
within the simple difference and the uncompromising exteriority of 
“image” and “reality”, of “outside” and “inside”, of “appearance” and 
“essence” with the entire system of oppositions which necessarily follows 
from it. Plato, who said basically the same thing about the relationship 
between writing, speech and being (or idea), had at least a more subtle, 
more critical and less complacent theory of image, painting and imitation 
than the one that presides over the birth of Saussurian linguistics” 
(original quotations and italics – 33).  
 
Thus, bearing the complexity of the complacency of Saussure’s linguistics about 
determining writing as an exterior phenomenon, exiled figuration, the outside, the 
double and repeating the gestures of Plato’s Phaedrus on writing as an artificial 
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technique, the eruption of the outside within inside, the living-presence of the soul 
within logos, has made him a captive of the entire Western tradition. All through the 
entire Western tradition, writing, the letter, the sensible inscription has always been 
considered as the body external to the spirit, to breath, to speech and logos or at its best, 
has only been perceived as clothing and image. “One already suspects that if writing is 
“image” and exterior “figuration”, this “representation” is not innocent. The outside 
bears with the inside a relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority. The 
meaning of the outside was always present within the inside, imprisoned outside the 
outside and vice versa” (original quotations – 35). Therefore, as any other positivistic 
and Western science, Saussure’s general science of linguistics, is found to be in the 
ultimate task of loading and recovering the ‘natural’, the originary and simple 
relationships between its concepts which always stand for an inside and an outside.     
Saussure’s general science of linguistics is erected upon its absolute youth, the 
purity of its origin, shortness of history and a fall which would have perverted the 
natural relationships with the break from the nature. The natural relationship between the 
outside and inside, the signified (concept or sense) to the phonic signifier would 
condition the natural relationship subordinating the writing (visible image) to speech. 
Thus, the original sin of writing, just like its repetition in the distraction of Adam before 
the innocence of the divine word, to usurp the superiority of speech to writing by giving 
in to ease that writing never takes place leads to the derivation that the natural movement 
could be thwarted, deviated or reversed. Therefore, Derrida accuses Saussure following 
the Western traditional auto-affectivity of speech being superior to writing and the 
usurpation of the latter in the intimate bound between the two. Writing is seen as a 
parasite that cannot be tolerated or confessed. Remaining just as an effect of speech and 
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phoné, writing, as the intertwining image or mirror inverting and perverting the 
representer, seems to usurp the natural relationship. Representation mingles with what it 
represents but only as a shadow or reflection of the representer. Seduced narcisstically, 
writing is a promiscuous and nefarious complicity of the reflection. Thus, in such a play 
of representation, the origin becomes ungraspable. 
“In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. 
There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference 
from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer 
a simple origin. For what is reflected is split in itself and not only as an 
addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits 
what it doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What 
can look at itself is not one; and the law of the addition of the origin to its 
representation, of the thing to its image, is that one plus one makes at 
least three. The historical usurpation and theoretical oddity that install the 
image within the rights of reality are determined as the forgetting of a 
simple origin” (original italics – 36).  
 
As Plato’s Phaedrus depicts, writing is a mnemotechnic means, supplanting good 
memory where spontaneous memory signifies forgetfulness because it is a mediation 
and departure form the logos. Writing is the dissimulation of the natural, primary and 
immediate presence of sense to the soul within the logos and the violence of which 
befalls the soul as unconsciousness. “Deconstructing this tradition will therefore not 
consist of reversing it, of making writing innocent. Rather of showing why the violence 
does not befall an innocent language. There is an originary violence of writing because 
language is first, in a sense, […] a writing. “Usurpation” has always already begun” 
(original quotations - 37). For Derrida, Socrates, in Phaedrus, has declared the historical 
violence of a speech dreaming its full self-presence, living itself as its own resumption. 
Speech has been stated as alive, capable of helping itself as its own father and lifted 
above the writing, whereas writing has been condemned as orphan and born out of a 
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primary gap and expatriation, and thus it has been left to wandering, blindness and 
mourning. This self-proclaimed language actually can only proceed by expelling the 
other and especially its own other, throwing it outside and below as writing. However, 
writing can only exist because it has usurped speech, but such a thing as phonic writing 
does not exist for Saussure. 
“Saussure confronts the system of the spoken language with the system of 
phonetic (and even alphabetic) writing as though with the telos of 
writing. The teleology leads to the interpretation of all eruptions of the 
nonphonetic within writing as transitory crisis and accident of passage, 
and it is right to consider this teleology to be Western enthnocentrism, a 
premathematical primitivism and a preformalist intuitionism. Even if this 
teleology responds to some absolute necessity, it should be problematized 
as such. The scandal of “usurpation” invites us expressly and intrinsically 
to do that” (original quotations – 40).  
 
What all of these points determine, for Derrida’s reversal of them, is that 
Saussure’s linguistics is never ‘general’ as long as it distinguishes rigorously its inside 
and its outside. And the system of ‘writing in general’ is not exterior to the system of 
linguistics in general, unless it is granted that the division between the exterior and the 
interior passes through the exteriority of the exterior and the interiority of the interior 
until the alien forces of its ‘immanent’ system intervene. This is why writing is not an 
image or figuration of language in general, especially the image within the system, upon 
which the act of exclusion is reconsidered. “Writing is not a sign of a sign [that will 
mean to say “alphabet”], except if one says it of all signs, which would be more 
profoundly true. If every sign refers to a sign, and if “sign of sign” signifies writing […] 
What Saussure saw without seeing, knew without being able to take into account, 
following in that the entire metaphysical tradition, is that a certain model of writing was 
necessarily but provisionally imposed (but for the inaccuracy in principle, insufficiency 
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of fact and the permanent usurpation) as instrument and technique of representation of a 
system of language. And that this movement, unique in style, was so profound that it 
permitted the thinking, within language, of concepts like those of the sign, technique, 
representation, language” (my brackets, original quotations – 43).  This epoch of speech 
produced the sense of being as presence and besides, in parenthesis, has, also, placed 
and suppressed all reflection on the origin of and the status of writing, except as a 
science of writing which is mere technology or the history of a technique, which leans 
upon mythology and comprehends writing as a metaphor. “It is this logocentrism which, 
limiting the internal system of language in general by a bad abstraction, prevents 
Saussure and the majority of his successors from determining fully and explicitly that 
which is called “the integral and concrete object of linguistics”” (original quotations – 
43). Thus, at the moment, when Saussure closes the parenthesis on the science of 
grammatology, he, in fact, inevitably opens the field of it. Then, for Derrida, one can 
recognize the possibility of something which was never given and which is nothing other 
than writing which, without any exclusion, writes itself within the discourse of Saussure.  
 If one considers the totality of determined signs and writing as inscription and 
the durable institution of a sign, ‘writing in general’, for Derrida, covers the entire field 
of linguistic signs. And in that field, a certain field of signifiers, the “graphic” in the 
narrow sense, hence written, even if they are phonic, may appear. “The very idea of 
institution – hence of the arbitrariness of the sign- is unthinkable before the possibility of 
writing and outside of its horizon. Quite simply, that is, outside of the horizon itself, 
outside the world as space of inscription, as the opening to the emission and to the 
spatial distribution of signs, to the regulated play of their differences, even if they are 
“phonic”” (original italics and quotations- Derrida 44).  The persistence upon the 
 88
distinction between nature and institution, of physis and nomos will invalidate its self-
evident functioning. Then Derrida concludes that what both Hegel and Saussure has 
called as ‘symbols’, that are the ‘natural’ signs, escape semiology as grammatology. The 
thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, accounts for a conventional relationship between 
the phoneme and the grapheme but irrevocably installs the latter to be an image of the 
former. What matters for Derrida is not that there is an ideographic filiation of the 
alphabet but that the synchronic structure and systematic principle of alphabetic writing 
has no relationship of natural representation, none of resemblance or participation be 
implied. “One must therefore challenge, in the very name of arbitrariness of the sign, the 
Saussurian definition of writing as “image” – hence as natural symbol- of language. Not 
to mention the fact that phoneme is the unimaginable itself, and no visibility can 
resemble it, it suffices to take into account what Saussure says about the difference 
between the symbol and the sign in order to be completely baffled as to how he can at 
the same time say of writing that it is an “image” or “figuration” of language and define 
language and writing elsewhere as “two distinct systems of signs”” (original quotations 
and italics– 45). Derrida’s proposal is that Saussure has never been able to think that 
writing was truly an image, a representation or a figuration of the spoken language, this 
is why he always needed these notions to decide upon writing as exteriority.  
Writing is more exterior to speech, not being its image or symbol and more 
interior to speech, which is in itself, a writing. Therefore, Derrida defines his concept of 
instituted trace, common to all systems of significations. Even the unmotivatedness of 
the link between the signifier and signified implies that there is no simple natural 
attachment in-between and the choice of the signifier is entirely left to the speaker, what 
matters in here is the question of naturalness rather than its attachment.  
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“That is why the word “institution” should not be too quickly interpreted 
within the classical system of oppositions. The instituted trace cannot be 
thought without thinking the retention of difference within a structure of 
reference where difference appears as such and thus permits a liberty of 
variations among the full terms. The absence of another here-and-now, of 
another transcendental present, of another origin of the world appearing 
as such, presenting itself as irreducible absence within the presence of the 
trace, is not a metaphysical formula substituted for a scientific concept of 
writing. This formula, beside the fact that it is the questioning of 
metaphysics itself, describes the structure implied by the “arbitrariness of 
the sign”, from the moment that one thinks of its possibility short of the 
derived opposition between nature and convention, symbol and sign, etc. 
These oppositions have meaning only after the possibility of the trace. 
The “unmotivatedness” of the sign requires a synthesis in which the 
completely other is announced as such – without any simplicity, any 
identity, any resemblance or continuity- within what is not it. Is 
announced as such: there we have all history, from what metaphysics has 
defined as “non-living” up to “consciousness”, passing through all levels 
of animal organization. The trace, where the relationship with the other is 
marked, articulates its possibility in the entire field of the entity, which 
metaphysics has defined as the being-present starting from the occulted 
movement of the trace.” (original quotations and italics – 46-7).  
4.2. Writing In General and the break of Idea/Word: “the play of the 
world…” 
The trace must be thought before the entity, for Derrida. The trace produces itself 
in self-occultation. However, this is not theological, either, which could only be a 
determined moment in the movement of the trace. The field of the entity, before being 
determined as the field of presence, is structured according to the possibilities of the 
trace. “The presentation of the other as such, that is to say, the dissimulation of its “as 
such”, has always already begun and no structure of the entity escapes it” (47). The 
unmotivatedness passes from one structure to another until the sign crosses the stage of 
the symbol. In what Saussure calls symbol, which does not interest semiology, there is 
no immotivation. The instituted trace, that Derrida names, also works within the same 
possibility, but without referring to a ‘nature’, it has always become. Then, Derrida 
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marks his point and says what Saussure does not say but has to be said: “there is neither 
symbol nor sign but a becoming-sign of symbol. [...] Thus, as it goes without saying, the 
trace whereof I speak is not more natural (it is not the mark, the natural sign or the index 
...) than cultural, not more physical than physic, biological than spiritual. It is that 
starting from which a becoming-unmotivated of the sign, and with it all the superior 
oppositions between physis  and its other, are possible” (47). In the becoming-
unmotivated of the symbol, we are in the play where the transcendental signified is 
absent. However, this play should not be understood as a play in the world, rather, it is 
the game of the world  that should be understood before attempting to understand all the 
forms of play in the world.  
The reduction to phonic matter, the difference between language and speech has 
kept writing in the narrow sense or as a parasite. In fact, Derrida does not believe 
general writing to be the idea of a system to be invented, an hypothetical characteristic 
or a future possibility, on the contrary, that oral language also belongs to writing but 
only on one condition, “that the “original” or the “natural” language etc. had never 
existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a 
writing” (56). He calls the difference between speech and its other as writing, because 
difference cannot be thought without trace. Writing has always threatened the most 
formidable difference; it has threatened the desire for the living speech, has breached the 
living speech from the very beginning. Therefore, Derrida, proposes his concept of 
‘arche-writing’ and calls it as such because it communicates with the vulgar concept of 
writing. This concept of arche-writing cannot and can never be recognized as the object 
of a science. It is that very thing which cannot let itself be reduced to the form of 
presence. It is at work not only in form or substance of the graphic expression but also in 
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those of nongraphic expressions. It also constitutes not only the pattern uniting form to 
substance, graphic or otherwise, but the movement of sign-function linking content to an 
expression to create a meaning, whether graphic or not.  
“It is because arche-writing, movement of difference, irreducible arche-
synthesis, opening in one and the same possibility, temporalization as 
well as relationship with the other and language, cannot, as the condition 
of all linguistic systems, form a part of the linguistic system itself and be 
situated as an object in its field. (Which does not mean it has a real field 
elsewhere, another assignable site.) Its concept could in no way enrich 
the scientific, positive and “immanent” description of the system itself” 
(original quotations, parenthesis and italics- 60).  
 
Jacques Derrida believes to be a short-of and beyond of transcendental criticism. 
In order for beyond to not return within is to recognize the necessity of the pathway. 
That pathway must leave a track in the text. Without that track, the transcendental text 
will also resemble the precritical text. This is how Derrida mediates on that resemblance:  
“What I call the erasure of concepts ought to mark the places of that 
future mediation. For example, the value of the transcendental arche must 
take its necessity felt before letting itself be erased. The concept of arche-
trace must comply with both that necessity and that erasure. It is in fact 
contradictory and not acceptable within the logic of identity. The trace is 
not only the disappearance of origin- within the discourse that we sustain 
and according to the path that we follow, it means that the origin did not 
even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a 
nonorigin. From then on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the 
classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an 
originary nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one 
must indeed speak of an originary trace or arche-trace. Yet we know that 
that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with the trace, there 
is above all no originary trace” (61).  
 
Even the concept of experience as originary presentation, in the reduced 
phenomenology of Husserl, cannot be explained without the thought of trace. And both 
of Saussure’s and Hjemslev’s linguistics, always work on oppositions as appearances 
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presupposed by an originary synthesis without absolute simplicity and differences to 
produce the reduction of phonic substance.  
“Such would be the originay trace. Without retention in the minimal unit 
of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other as other in the 
same, no difference would do its difference here, but rather, before all 
determination of the content, of the pure movement which produces 
difference. The (pure) trace is differance. It does not depend on any 
sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the 
contrary, the condition of such plenitude. Although it does not exist, 
although it is never a being-present outside of all plenitude, its possibility 
is by rights anterior to all that one calls sign (signified/ signifier, content/ 
expression etc.), concept or operation, motor or sensory. This differance 
therefore is not more sensible than intelligible and it permits the 
articulation of signs among themselves within the same abstract order – a 
phonic or graphic text for example- or between two orders of expression. 
It permits the articulation of speech and writing – in the colloquial sense- 
as it founds the metaphysical opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible, then between signifier and signified, expression and content 
etc. If language were not already, in that sense, a writing, no derived 
“notation” would be possible; and the classical problem of the 
relationships between speech and writing could not arise. Of course, the 
positive sciences of signification can only describe the work and the fact 
of difference, the determined differences and the determined presences 
that they make possible. There cannot be a science of difference itself in 
its operation, as it is impossible to have a science of the origin of 
presence itself, that is to say of a certain nonorigin” (original quotations-
62). 
 
Therefore, for Derrida, difference should be regarded as the formation of form. 
Saussure has retained the concept for the signified and the sound-image for the signifier. 
The sound-image is different than objective sound, it is what is heard; not the sound 
itself but the being heard of the sound. Being-heard is phenomenal and belongs to an 
order that is dissimilar to the sound in the world. The structured appearance 
[l’apparaître] of the sound, as sensory matter, lived and informed by difference is called 
the physic image by Saussure. The word physic is by all rights a reduction towards being 
in the world, marking the subject’s place well in the distinction between the internal and 
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external lived experience. Therefore, it has been indispensable for Saussure to keep the 
difference between the appearing sound and appearing of the sound.  
“These precautions taken, it should be recognized that it is in the specific 
zone of this imprint and this trace, in the temporalization of a lived 
experience which is neither in the world nor in “another world”, which is 
not more sonorous than luminous, not more in time than in space, that 
differences appear among the elements or rather produce them, make 
them emerge as such and constitute the texts, the chains, and the systems 
of traces. These chains and systems cannot be outlined except in the 
fabric of this trace or imprint. The unheard difference between the 
appearing and the appearance [l’apparaissant et l’apparaître] (between 
the “world” and “lived experience”) is the condition of all other 
differences, of all other traces, and it is already a trace […] The trace is 
in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying 
once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace 
is difference which opens appearance [l’apparaître] and signification. 
Articulating the living upon the nonliving in general, origin of all 
repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is not more ideal than real, not 
more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent signification than 
an opaque energy and no concept of metaphysics can describe it” 
(original quotations, brackets and italics - 65).  
 
The idea of physic imprint refers to the idea of articulation. Without the 
difference between the sensory appearing and its lived appearing [l’apparaître], the 
temporalizing synthesis, the chain of significations could not operate. The irreducibility 
of the imprint also refers to its passivity, which is also a relationship to an absolute past. 
That is what authorizes Derrida to call trace that does not let itself be summed up to any 
simplicity of present and obliges us to think of a past that can never be lived in the 
present, as present-past. “Since past has signified past-present, the absolute past that is 
retained in the trace no longer rigorously merits the name “past”. Another name to erase, 
especially since the strange movement of the trace proclaims as much as it recalls: 
difference defers-differs [différe]. With the same precaution and under the same erasure, 
it may be said that its passivity is also its relationship with the “future”. The concepts of 
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present, past, and future, everything in the concepts of time and history which implies 
evidence of them –the metaphysical concept of time in general- cannot adequately 
describe the structure of the trace” (original quotations and italics - 67). It is no chance 
that the transcendental phenomenology of the internal time-consciousness, so careful to 
place cosmic time within brackets, live at a time that is accomplice to the time of the 
world. Perception, consciousness and the world are all on the same plane that does not 
even allow a rupture intrude between them. “It is in a certain “unheard” sense, then, that 
speech is in the world, rooted in that very passivity which metaphysics calls sensibility 
in general” (original quotations - 67),  which runs in accordance with the idea that logos 
is imprinted and that imprint is the writing-resource of language under the noncreative, 
eternal and continuous full element of the divine word. “But it would mean a single step 
outside of metaphysics if nothing more than a new motif of “return to finitude”, of 
“God’s death” etc., were the result of this move. It is that conceptuality and that 
problematics that must be deconstructed. They belong to the onto-theology they fight 
against. Differance is also something other than finitude” (original quotations - 68). 
The passivity of speech is also its relationship with language. And the 
relationship between passivity and difference cannot be thought without the relationship 
between unconscious of language (as the rootedness within language) and the spacing 
(pause, blank, punctuation etc.) as the origin of signification.  
“Spacing (notice that this word speaks the articulation of space and time, 
the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space) is always 
the unperceived, the nonpresent and the nonconscious. As such, if one can 
still use that expression in a non-phenomenological way; for here we pass 
the very limits of phenomenology. Arche-writing as spacing cannot occur 
as such within the phenomenological experience of a presence. It marks 
the dead time within the presence of the living present, within the general 
form of all presence. The dead time is at work. That is why, once again, 
in spite of all the discursive resources that the former may borrow from 
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the latter, the concept of the trace will never be merged with a 
phenomenology of writing. As the phenomenology of the sign in general, 
a phenomenology of writing is impossible. No intuition can be realized in 
the place where ‘the whites’ indeed take on an importance” (original 
italics, my underlines - 68).  
 
Writing, then, is always other than the subject and should never be thought under 
the category of the subject; “however it is modified, however it is endowed with 
consciousness or unconsciousness, it will refer, by the entire thread of history, to the 
substantiality of a presence unperturbed by accidents, or to the identity of the selfsame 
[le propre] in the presence of self-relationship. And the thread of that history clearly 
does not run within the borders of metaphysics” (69). In that history, the whites had 
always justified their language, chosen their own words within an historical strategy.  
Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent of the subject. Otherwise, it would fall 
into the self-relationship of subject with its own death in the eddy of the constitution of 
subjectivity. That is to say, for all organizations of life; that constitution of subjectivity 
runs by the economy of death. The spacing cuts, drops and causes the subject drop 
within the unconscious, because for Derrida, the unconscious is nothing without this 
cadence and before this caesura and discontinuity. The spacing, then, marks the 
impossibility that a sign, the unity of the signifier and the signified, be produced within 
the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence. Arche-writing is spacing, as the 
possibility of the spoken word, the graphie in the narrow sense is the opening of first 
exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living with its other and of an 
inside and outside.  
“The outside, “spatial” and “objective” exteriority which we believe we 
know as the most familiar thing in the world, as familiarity itself, would 
not appear without the grammé, without difference as temporalization, 
without the nonpresence of the other inscribed within the sense of the 
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present, without the relationship with death as the concrete structure of 
the living present […] The presence-absence of the trace, which one 
should not even call its ambiguity but rather its play (for the word 
“ambiguity” requires the logic of presence, even when it begins to 
disobey that logic), carries in itself the problems of the letter and the 
spirit, of body and soul, and of all the problems whose primary affinity I 
have recalled. All dualisms, all theories of the immortality of the soul or 
of the spirit, as well as all monisms, spiritualist or materialist, dialectical 
or vulgar, are the unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was 
compelled to strive toward the reduction of the trace. The subordination 
of the trace to the full presence summed up in the logos, the humbling of 
writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such are the gestures 
required by an onto-theology determining the archeological and 
eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without 
a trace: another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name 
holds death in check” (71). 
 
The linearist concept of time is one of the deepest adherences of the modern 
concept of the sign to its own history. At the limit, it, indeed, is the very concept of the 
sign itself; between the signifying and signified faces, it is committed to the classical 
ontology. The reference to a signified thinkable outside of signifiers is dependent to the 
onto-theology that is underlined in Western metaphysics.  
“It is thus the idea of the sign that must be deconstructed through a 
meditation upon writing which would merge, as it must, with the undoing 
of onto-theology faithfully repeating it in its totality and making it 
insecure in its most assured evidences. One is necessarily led to this from 
the moment that the trace affects the totality of the sign in both of its 
faces. That the signified is originarily and essentially (and not only for a 
finite and created spirit) trace, that it is always already in the position of 
the signifier, is the apparently innocent proposition within which the 
metaphysics of the logos, of presence and consciousness, must reflect 
upon writing as its death and its resource” (original italics - 73).  
 
Then one can say that Derrida’s concept of arche-writing has already been 
announced back in Benjamin’s inference on ‘Mimetic Faculty’ that writing is 
everywhere. However, Derrida does not see writing at the limit of a perceptual map, in 
reserve as the unconscious of a writer behind for a possible inquiry.  
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Since Derrida does not leave a trace stabilized, because the trace is always-
already becoming, is grammatology possible, then? Or is it impossible, which would 
retrace us to its very possibility. On what conditions could it be possible, if it even risks 
destroying the concept of science? Its very possibility is also its impossibility. Before all, 
it never should begin its inquiry with the instituting question of philosophy: ‘what is’, 
neither with the question ‘where and how has writing begun?’ Otherwise, it would 
reduce itself into the very thing it accuses of being reductionist as determining the 
moment and places of the first phenomena of writing. These are questions of origin and 
therefore, of essence and remain within the margins of metaphysics. However, the trace 
should teach us that there is no origin; that is to say; no simple origin. 
 
4.3. Shattering the Play of Articulations: Literary Communism  
                   and Compearance 
Then we are left without the simplicity of origins. How could this be put out or 
could it ever be possible to project that statement forward? Jean-Luc Nancy’ reading of 
entity (Being) and word-as-being gives a clue of the dissemination of the determination 
of ‘word’ (Being). Jean-Luc Nancy has defined a concept: ‘being singular-plural’. 
“Being singular-plural: these three apposite words, which do not have any determined 
syntax (“being” is verb or noun; “singular” and “plural” are nouns or adjectives; all can 
be rearranged in different combinations), mark up an absolute equivalence, both in an 
indistinct and distinct way. Being is singularly plural and plurally singular” (original 
quotations – Nancy, Being Singular Plural 28). However, singular-plural also constitutes 
the essence of Being but it is a constitution that undoes every single and substantial 
essence of Being because there is nothing existing prior to the singular-plural; only what 
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exists exists. The co-implication of this existence is, also, co-existence, which means the 
sharing of a world. A world is not something exterior to existence, it is the coexistence 
that outs these existences together. Being singular-plural also means the essence of 
Being is only a co-essence. The co-essence or being-with (being-with-many) designates 
the essence of the co- (the cum) itself in the position or guise of an essence. The “with” 
that constitutes the being is not simply an addition to some prior being; instead it is at 
the center of being. Therefore, coessentiality signifies the essential sharing of 
essentiality, sharing in the guise of assembling. Indeed, what Nancy tries to propose is 
that for the whole of philosophy, any exposition does not prevent the deeply set order of 
reasons from being regulated by a co-originarity. “Philosophy is, in sum, the thinking of 
being-with; because of this, it is also thinking-with as such” (31).  
The singular-plural is in such a way that the singularity of each is indissociable 
from a plurality. The singular-being, which is not an individual, is the finite being. It 
does not proceed form the scene of form and ground, appearing and appearance to which 
the anesthetizing nihilism of the individualism always culminates. It is not subjected to a 
process of singularization, is not extracted, produced or derived and does not proceed 
from anything. It, also, is not the particular that can only present its difference from 
other particular as numerical difference. “Its birth does not take place from out of or as 
effect of: on the contrary, it provides the measure according to which birth, as such, is 
neither a production nor a self-positioning, the measure according to which the infinite 
birth of finitude is not a process that emerges from a ground or from a fund of some 
kind. The “ground” is itself, through itself and as such, already the finitude of 
singularities. It is a groundless “ground”, less in the sense that it opens up the gaping 
chasm of an abyss than that it is made up only of the network, the interweaving, and the 
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sharing of singularities […]” (original quotations – Nancy, The Inoperative Community 
27). The singular being does not emerge or rise up against the background of a chaotic 
or undifferentiated identity of beings or against their unitary or that of a becoming or 
will. Singular being appears, as finitude itself at the end or at the beginning with the 
“contact of skin (or heart)” of another singular being, at the confines of the same 
singularity that is always other, always shared, always exposed.  The singular is plural. 
“In Latin, the term singuli already says the plural, because it designates the “one” as 
belonging to “one by one”” (original quotations – Nancy, Being Singular Plural 32). 
The singular is each one and, also, with and among all the others. This, also, offers the 
property of indivisibility, However, it is not indivisible like any particular is indivisible; 
“the singular is each time for the whole, in its place and in light of it. If humanity is for 
being in totality [...], then it is the exposing of the singular as such and in general” (32).  
A singularity is not lodged on the background of Being, it is Being itself or its origin. 
The essence of Being is the shock of the instant. Each time, Being is always an instant. 
“As a result, it is always an instance of “with”: singulars singularly together, where the 
togetherness is neither the sum, nor the incorporation, nor the “society”, nor the 
“community” (where these words only give rise to problems).The togetherness of 
singulars is singularity “itself”. It “assembles” them insofar as it spaces them; they are 
“linked” insofar as they are not unified” (original quotations - 33).  Singular being is an 
ego, but not a subject in the sense of a relation of the self to itself. According to these 
conditions, then, Being as being-with can no longer be able to say itself in the third 
person. There would no longer be a point of view exterior to being from which it could 
be announced that ‘there is being’ because there is no longer the ‘I am’ that is subjacent 
to the announcement of ‘there is’. 
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 The ‘one’ and the ‘other’ is neither ‘by’, ‘for’, ‘in’, ‘despite’ but ‘with’. The 
‘with’ is more and less than a bond or relation, especially if such a relation or bond 
presupposes the term upon which it relies. The ‘with’ is the sharing of time-space; it is 
at-the-same-time-in-the-same-place and in itself shattered. It does not indicate the 
sharing of a common situation any more than the juxtaposition of pure exteriorities. It is 
the instant scaling back upon the identity. Being is at the same time in the same place 
only on the condition of the spacing of an indefinite plurality of singularities. Being is 
with being; it does not recover itself but is near to itself, in touch with itself in the 
paradox of where distancing and strangeness are revealed. We are each time an other, 
each time with others. 
 To designate what the being-with of Being is the original situation of the West, 
the problem of the city, whose repetition has led to a sort of antinomy; on the one side of 
which lies the exposure of the world and on the other, the end of the representations of 
the world. “This means nothing short of a transformation in the relation [that we name] 
“politico-philosophy”: it can no longer be a matter of a single community, of its essence, 
closure and sovereignty; by contrast, it can no longer be a matter of organizing 
community according to the decrees of a sovereign Other, or according to the telos of 
history. It can no longer be a matter of treating sociability as a regrettable and inevitable 
accident, as constraint that has to be managed in some way or another. Community is 
bare, but it is imperative” (original brackets, italics and quotations – 35-6). The laying 
bare of sovereignty presupposes one to take a certain distance from the political. “This 
distance is not taken in order to engage in a depoliticized thinking, but in order to engage 
in a thinking, the site of which is the very constitution, imagination and signification of 
the political, which allows this thinking to retrace its path in its retreat and beginning 
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from this retreat. The retreat of the political does not signify the disappearance of the 
political. It only signifies the disappearance of the philosophical presupposition of the 
whole politico-philosophical order, which is always an ontological presupposition” (36-
7). The retreat of the political, in other words, signifies the ontological laying bare and 
uncovering of the being-with.  
 Being singular plural without punctuation or a mark of equivalence, implication 
or sequence; a single, continuous-discontinuous mark tracing out the entire ontological 
domain and its presuppositions and dealing a blow onto it, carries out another syntax in 
itself. None of the terms, in the so-constructed phrase ‘being singular plural’, precedes 
the other, each designates the coessence of the others. “This coessence puts essence 
itself in the hyphenation – “being-singular-plural”- which is a mark of union and also a 
mark of division, a mark of sharing that effaces itself, leaving each term to its isolation 
and its being-with-the-others” (original italics - 37).  
More originary than individuality and essence of Being, Being is with, it is as the 
with of Being itself, so that Being does not identify itself as such but shows itself, 
exposes itself, gives itself, occurs, disposes itself (made event, history and world) as its 
won singular-plural with. It is no more a matter of an originary multiplicity and its 
correlation than it is a matter of an originary unity and its division. It is an increase or 
excess of origin in the origin. One is more than one, it is not that it divides itself, rather it 
is that one equals more than one, it is the ‘more’ of its exposition. It is an excess of 
unity, it is one-with-one, where Being in itself is copresent. The co- of copresence is not 
subject to a logical presentation. “Neither to be present nor to be presented (nor, as a 
result, “unrepresentable” in the strict sense), the “with” is the (singular plural) condition 
of presence in general [understood] as copresence. The co-presence is neither a presence 
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withdrawn into absence nor a presence in itself or for itself” (original parenthesis and 
brackets - 40). It, also, is not pure presence to itself or to others or to the world. In fact, 
none of these presences can take place, unless copresence can take place. In the classical 
ontology, a subject not only assumes its distinction from the object of its representation 
but also from all other subjects. Therefore, the ‘with’ is the supposition of the ‘self’ in 
general. This is presence-with. Being-many-together is the originary situation, it is even 
what defines a situation in general. “Therefore an originary or transcendental “with” 
demands, with a palpable urgency, to be disentangled and articulated from itself. But 
one of the greatest difficulties of the concept of the with is that there is no “getting back 
to” or “up to” this “originary” or “transcendental” position: the with is strictly 
contemporaneous with all existence, as it is with all thinking” (original quotations- 41).  
The most fundamental requirement of ontology asking for a presupposition that it 
itself defines, cannot be assumed to be the simple singular that its name indicates. Its 
being singular is plural in its very being. Presence or rationality cannot be thought 
starting from something else, then it follows that “not only must being-with-one-another 
not be understood starting from the presupposition of being-one, but on the contrary, 
being-one can only be understood by starting from being-with-one-another” (original 
italics - 56). What happens, then, with the laying bare of the social is an act of 
symbolicity. It must be well understood of what is meant by this word symbol. It is 
making a connection or joining and giving a face to this liaison by making an image. 
However, that relation is not a representation of something real but the relation is 
nothing other than what is real in the relation, that is, its effectiveness and its efficacy. 
The symbol is the joint where the surface and the depth touch and always become. “The 
sole criterion of symbolization is exclusion or the debasement of the image, but instead 
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the capacity for allowing a certain play, in and by the image-symbol, with the joining, 
the distancing, the opened interval that articulates it as sym-bol: this word simply means 
“put-with” (the Greek sun equals the Latin cum), so that the dimension, space and the 
nature of the “with” are in play here” (original parenthesis and quotations - 58). 
Therefore, when Jean-Luc Nancy speaks of social reality’s laying bare itself, he is, in 
fact, trying to talk about society “uncovered”, society no longer being the appearance of 
itself, no longer reduced to a background of signification (no community, no mystical 
body) but a society making a symbol of itself and its appearance by facing itself in order 
to be all that it is and has to be. “In this way, being-social is not reduced to any 
assumption of an interior or superior unity. Its unity is wholly symbolic; it is wholly of 
the with. Being-social is Being that is by appearing in the face of itself, faced with itself: 
it is co-appearing” (59).  Co-appearance does not mean that subjects appear together. 
The word “together” always ends up in the dead end of metaphysics, where social is 
seen as a transitory phenomenon, which ends up in the hypostasis of the togetherness or 
common (communion or community) or to the hypostasis of the individual where the 
association of the Being is instrumentalized and related to something other than itself. 
Together and being-together are not the same. Together can only stand as the adverb of 
being-together. Togetherness is a substantive entity, a collection of the essence and of 
the origin. Together means simultaneity, that is, “at the same time”. Being at the same 
time and the same place, which is the determination of time as contemporary time, 
assumes that subjects share this space-time, share it between themselves, symbolize it at 
the same time-space. However, Nancy rejects that time-space is, first of all, the 
possibility of the “with”. Time is the succession of the pure moment without 
simultaneity. Time already implies “at the same time”.  “Simultaneity immediately 
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opens space as the spacing of time itself. Starting from the simultaneity of “subjects”, 
time is possible, but above all, is necessary. For in order to be together and to 
communicate, a correlation of places and a transition of passages from one place to 
another is necessary. Sharing and passage control each other reciprocally” (original 
quotations and italics - 61).  Therefore, the “together” remains to be an absolutely 
originary structure and determines that what is not together is in the no-time-no-place of 
non-Being. “Co-apperance, then, must signify – because this is what is now at stake – 
that “appearing” (coming into the world and being in the world, or existence as such) is 
strictly inseperable, indiscernible from the cum or the with, which is not only its place 
and its taking place, but also – and this is the same thing- its fundamental ontological 
structure” (61). The “with” as such is unpresentable and presence is impossible without 
co-presence. What is proper to the community, then, is that, it has no other resource to 
appropriate except the “with” that constitutes it, its interiority without an interior. This is 
the cum of co-appearance, in which we do nothing but appear together with one another 
before no authority into the randomly contingent, exterior pure and simple with. “We are 
thus in a suspension of history where an enigma is gathering anew; we are 
contemporaries of ourselves, contemporaries of the stripping bare of being-in-common” 
(63).  
Society sees itself or exposes itself bared to this common excess. Society knows 
itself bare when exposed to this common excess, commonality of origin or when it 
attains the knowledge of a “we”. The “we” neither says the “One” nor the togetherness 
of the ones and others but say the “one” in a singular plural way, that is, one by one and 
one with one.  Opening to the other or occurring as the other, the self has its originarity 
in the loss of the self. Birth and death become the marks of point of origin and 
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destination within the other as a loss. My birth is only possible through the death of the 
other has been the gist of Western metaphysics (Hegel). The other for, Nancy, does not 
belong to the realm of “with”, it is nearer and further than every mode of being. “It does 
not accompany identity; it crosses throught it, and transgresses it; it transfixes it. Within 
the discourse about alterity, a general mode of trans- (transport, transaction, 
transcription, transfer, transmission, transformation, transparency, transubstantiation, 
transcendence) continually runs alongside the mode of cum-, but it will never be able to 
eclipse it or replace it” (original italics - 78). The subject is born into its own intimacy, 
more interior than the interior. In this way, then, “solitude” appears and which is nothing 
but a Christian event, for Nancy. Consciousness of self is the solitude. The other has its 
moment of identity in the divine Other, which is also the moment of identity of 
everything and of the universal. For Nancy, “the Other is the place of community as 
communion, that is, the place of a being-self-in-other that would no longer be altered or 
where such alteration would be identification. In this world, the mystery of communion 
announces itself in the form of the nearby” (original italics - 79). The question of 
intimacy imposes the imperial of love; the hidden intimacy of the necessity of loving 
oneself in the other. What matters in the matter of love and deconstructing Western 
ontology, which is at the heart of Being is that; “it [love] designates itself at the heart of 
Being – in lieu of an din place of Being - and designates this relation, of one another, as 
the infinite relation of the same to the same as originarily other than itself. “Love” is the 
abyss of the self in itself; it is “delectation” or “taking care” of what originarily escapes 
or is lacking: it consists in taking care of this retreat and in this retreat” (original italics - 
80). The measure of the nearby laid bare has been determined in Western ontology as 
indeterminate in order to designate an Other of the societal where the societal itself (the 
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commonness as a Being or as a common subject) would be made in itself or for itself 
and that it would be the very sameness of the other and the sameness as Other. “In 
contrast, being-with designates the other that never comes back to the same, the plurality 
of origins. The just measure of the with, or more exactly, the with or being-with as just 
measure, as justness and justice, is the measure of dis-position as such: the measure of 
the distance from one origin to another” (81).  
The origin is something other than a starting point, it is both an appearing and a 
principle and repeats itself at each moment of what it originates. It is an incessant 
creation, it becomes. The world does not have an origin outside itself, it has its origin in 
itself and occurs at each moment of the world. “It is the each time of Being, and its 
realm is the being-with of each time with every [other] time. The origin is for and by 
way of the singular plural of every possible origin. The “with” is the measure of an 
origin-of-the-world as such, or even of an origin-of-meaning as such. To-be-with is to 
make sense mutually, and only mutually. Meaning is the fullest measure of the 
incommensurable “with”. The “with” is the fullest measure of (the) incommensurable 
meaning (of Being)” (original quotations, parenthesis and brackets - 83). The plurality of 
origins designates the Origin of the world, its springing forth everywhere, in each instant 
and simultaneously. This is how it comes to appear out of nothing and is created. Its 
creation must not be understood under the guise of some particular operation; “it is, 
insofar as it is, as created, as having arisen, come or grown; it has always already sprung 
from all sides or more exactly, it is itself the springing forth and the something of the 
“always already” and the “everywhere”. As such, each being belongs to the (authentic) 
origin, each is originary (the springing forth of the springing forth itself), and each is 
original (incomparable, underivable). Nevertheless, all of them share the originarity and 
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originality; this sharing is itself the origin” (original italics and parenthesis, my underline 
- 83). However, what is shared is not a unique substance in which each would 
participate; what is shared is what shares, what is constituted as sharing and what is 
called ‘matter’. Matter does not designate a substance or a subject, but designates what 
is divided of itself and remains impenetrable to the ‘spirit’, which is beyond the world. 
The ontology of being-with is the ontology of bodies, whether they be animate, 
inanimate, sentient, speaking, thinking, having weight etc. Body means the outside, it is 
the sharing of and the departure from the self and goes from itself to itself; “the nearby-
to-self without which the “self” would not even be “on its own””(original quotations - 
84).  
Stoics have stated that language is the incorporeal. Saying is corporeal but what 
is said is incorporeal. Language is not in the world. “Language is not in the world or 
inside the world, as though the world were its body: it is the outside of the world in the 
world; it is not the eruption of an Other, which would clear away or sublimate the world, 
which would transcribe it into something else; instead, it is the exposition of the world-
of-bodies as such, that is, as originarily singular plural” (84). Language is the exposition 
of plural singularity. All of being is exposed as meaning, the originary sharing which 
relates a being to being as the circulation of meaning of the world which has no 
beginning or end where no presence is for oneself without being for others. This is also 
why the essential dialogue of polylogue of language (‘(understanding)-oneself speak’) is 
both the one in which we speak to one another and the one in which I speak to myself. 
At this point, the exigency of singularity exposes itself. “It is not individuality; it is each 
time, the punctuationality of a “with” that establishes a certain origin of meaning and 
connects it to an infinity of other possible origins. Therefore, it is, at one and the same 
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time, infra-/intraindividual and transindividual, and always the two together” (85). This 
is why, there is no ultimate language but languages, words, voices; “an originarily 
singular sharing of voices without which there would be no voice” (85).  In the 
incorporeal position of language, all beings pass through humanity and exposes 
humanity outside of what is human, to the meaning of the world and therefore humanity 
remains as a concept. However, humanity is not the subject of the world; it does not 
represent the world, neither gives meaning to it. Exposed as gifted with language, it 
exposes the world itself as the condition of being-with-all-beings in the world. The 
Being exposes itself as between and with of singulars and is its own reason. It does not 
have another reason does not mean that it carries its own telos within itself. It says what 
can only be said (which is also called the ineffable), it is “what cannot be presented as a 
being among others, since it is the “among” of all beings (among: inside, in the middle 
of, with), which are each and every time among one another” (original italics, 
parenthesis and quotations - 86). Since Being is exposed in the incorporeality of the 
saying, this does not mean that Being is only a word. As soon as a word is spoken, it is 
resaid.  Meaning does not occur in the transmission between a receiver and a speaker, 
but in the simultaneity of two origins: that of the saying and of its resaying. “For a word 
is what it is only among all words, and a spoken word is what it is only in the “with” of 
all speaking. Language is essentially in the with. Every spoken word is the simultaneity 
of at least two different modes of that spoken word: even I am by myself, there is the 
one that is said and the one that is heard, that is, the one that is resaid” (86). Meaning 
must return to me in order for me to be resaid by me, in this way, what comes back, also, 
becomes another origin of meaning. Meaning is the passing back and forth and sharing 
the origin at the origin as singular plural and the exposition of the foundation; “simply 
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the with of things as they are, insofar as they are. Logos is dialogue, but the end [or 
purpose] of dialogue is not to overcome itself in “consensus”; its reason is to offer, and 
only to offer (giving it tone and intensity), the cum-, the with of meaning, the plurality of 
its springing forth” (original quotations, italics and parenthesis - 87). It is enough, then, 
to oppose idle chatter to the authenticity of the spoken word as poetic distinction. It is a 
question, then, of understanding the imminent exhaustion of signification as a trans-
lation, in the sense of a stretching or spreading out from one origin of meaning to 
another. From the point of view of signification, language constitutes itself from out of 
“as” and presents one thing as another and itself, is a mere metaphor but from the point 
of view of meaning and truth, it presents the “as” as such. It presents the exteriority of 
the thing, its being-before and being-with-all-things (and not its being-elsewhere). 
“Every spoken word brings to speech this “as itself”, that is, the mutual exposition and 
disposition of the singularities of the world (of a world of singularities, of singular 
worlds, or world-singularities). Language is the element of the with as such: it is the 
space of its declaration. In turn, this declaration as such refers to everyone and to no one, 
refers to the world and to its coexistence” (original italics - 88).  
Death, which does not take place for the subject but just for its representation, 
interrupts the totality of saying. Death, as such, like birth, takes place as language in and 
through being-with-one-another. As the “as” without quality, death “[…] is the very 
signature of the “with”: the dead are those who are no longer “with” and are, at the same 
time, those who take their places according to an exact measure, of the 
incommensurable, the appropriate measure, of the incommensurable “with”” (original 
quotations - 89). If one is born or dies as an origin of meaning, it follows then, one is 
never born alone or dies alone. The solitude of birth/death is no longer solitude but the 
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exact reverse of its sharing. Language, then, is not a diversion or an arrangement with 
the intolerability of death but the tragedy itself, that is to say, the destitution of meaning 
that grasps the origin as singular-plural. “Language exposes death: it neither denies it, 
nor affirms it; it brings it to language, and death is nothing but that, that which is 
essentially brought to language – and that which brings it there” (90). ‘Literature’ is 
language stretched out toward birth and death, striving toward address, understanding 
and conversation; it is multiple sharing without which there would be no “as” in general. 
Literature is the being-in-common of what has no common origin, but is originarily in-
common or with. Therefore, death cannot be defined as negativity because language 
does not know or practice negativity. “Before being spoken, before being a particular 
language or signification, before being verbal, “language” is the following: the extension 
and simultaneity of the “with” insofar as it is the ownmost power of a body, the propriety 
of its touching another body (or of touching itself), which is nothing other than its 
definition as body. It finishes itself there, where it is-with; that is, it comes to a stop and 
accomplishes itself in a single gesture” (original quotations, italics and parenthesis - 92).  
In this sense, then, “to speak with” is not speaking to oneself or to another, nor saying, 
nor proffering in order to bring forth meaning. “To speak with” is conversation and 
being-exposed, which exposes only the secret of its own exposition. It is en euphemism 
for saying or not saying nothing more than what ‘wanting to say’ means in many 
different ways; it says Being itself as communication and thinking. “”Language” is not 
an instrument of communication, and communication is not an instrument of Being; 
communication is Being, and Being is, as a consequence, nothing but the incorporeal by 
which bodies express themselves to one another as such” (original quotations and italics 
- 93).   
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 It could be said that community is revealed through the death of others. It takes 
place through others and to others. It is not the communion that fuses the egos into an 
“Ego” or a higher “We”. It is the community of others and therefore it occupies a 
singular place that assumes the impossibility of its own ‘immanence’, and the 
impossibility of a communitarian being in the form of a subject is humanism or what 
Nancy defines as ‘immanentism’.   
“Community means, consequently, that there is no singular being without 
another singular being, and that there is, therefore, what might be called, 
in a rather inappropriate idiom, an originary or ontological “sociality”, 
that in its principle extends far beyond the simple theme of man as a 
social being (the zoon politikon). For, on the one hand, it is not obvious 
that the community of singularities is limited to “man” and excludes, for 
example, the “animal” (even in the case of “man” and not also the 
“inhuman” or the “superhuman”, or, for example, if I may say so with 
and without a certain Witz, “woman”: after all, the difference between the 
sexes is itself a singularity in the difference of singularities). On the other 
hand, if social being is always posited as a predicate of man, community 
would signify on the contrary the basis for thinking only something like 
“man”. But this thinking would at the same time, remain dependent upon 
a principial determination of community, namely, that there is no 
communion of singularities in a totality superior to them and immanent to 
their common being” (original quotations, italics and parenthesis – 
Nancy, Inoperative Community 28).  
 
 In such a place of communion, there is communication. The singular being is 
not anything, neither a ground, nor an essence, nor a substance but appears, presents 
itself and exists as a communication. In order to designate this singular mode of 
appearing, which is more originary than any other and always shares itself as origin; 
for Nancy, “we would need to be able to say that finitude co-appears or compears 
[com-parait] and can only compear: in this formulation, we need to hear that finite 
being always presents itself “together”, hence severally” (original quotation, italics 
and brackets - 28). Communication consists before all else in this sharing and in this 
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compearance of finitude. Therefore, it is not a bond more originary than the bond. It 
does not set itself up, it does not establish itself and does not emerge among already 
given subjects. Only in this communication, singular beings are given, without a 
bond and without communion. In this communication, a like-being resembles me in 
that I myself resemble him; we resemble together. That means that there is no 
original or origin of identity. What holds the place of an origin is the sharing of 
singularities. “This means that this “origin” – the origin of community or the 
originary community- is nothing other than the limit: the origin is the tracing of the 
borders upon which or along which singular beings are exposed. We are alike 
because each one of us is exposed to the outside that we are for ourselves. The like 
is not the same. I do not rediscover myself, nor do I recognize myself in the other: I 
experience the other’s alterity, or I experience alterity in the other together with the 
alteration that “in me” sets my singularity outside me and infinitely delimits it. 
Community is that singular ontological order in which the other and the same are 
alike: that is to say, in the sharing of identity” (original quotations, italics – 33-4).   
 Where Nancy takes us is the community of interrupted myth, a community 
without a community or a communism without a community. This community is to 
come, in the sense that it is always coming incessantly; the becoming-community of 
community where the singular beings take the place of their taking place, without 
this place being a ‘topoi’, a place reserved for a subject, presence or sovereignty. 
“Community without community is to come, in the sense that it is always coming, 
endlessly, at the heart of every collectivity (because it never stops coming, it 
ceaselessly resists collectivity itself as much as it resists the individual). It is no 
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more than this: to come to the limits of compearance, to that limit to which we are in 
effect convoked, called and sent” (71). 
 There is the unworking of the works of the individuals in the community 
(writers) and the products of the unworking of the community (literature); its 
peoples, its towns, its treasures, its patrimonies, its traditions, its capital. These are 
the same unworkings, both of which belong to the other. However, what is exposed 
in the work or through works begins and ends infinitely within and beyond the work, 
where work is offered up to the infinite communication of community. The work or 
the community presenting itself as work must be offered up for communication. This 
does not mean that the work must be “communicable”; no intelligibility or 
transmissibility is required of it. That the work must be offered up for 
communication means that it must be offered, that is to say, presented, proposed and 
abandoned at the common limit where singular beings share one another. Then, the 
work becomes a work at the moment of its completion and must be abandoned at 
this limit. “And this can only happen if, by itself and for itself, the work does 
nothing other than trace and retrace this limit: in other words, only if it does nothing 
other than inscribe singularity/community, or inscribe itself as singular/common, as 
infinitely singular/common” (73). The work when offered up for communication 
does not pass into a common space; since there is no common place but the sharing 
of places and their spacing. Although the work might as well be a communal work, 
since constituted with “with”, one never works alone and writes alone and the 
singularity of the working being cannot be presented in isolated individuality. In its 
unworking, the work does not become back a common substance, does not circulate 
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in a common exchange, does not melt into the community itself as a work and does 
not function commercially in a society.      
Then Jean-Luc Nancy poses his provisional phrase: “literary communism”. It can 
hardly be aligned with the idea of communism that communists or with the idea of 
literature that writers or critics have meant for an epoch of our history. What it stakes is 
the very articulation of community, which means “writing” as an inscription of meaning 
whose transcendence or presence is indefinitely and constitutively deferred. Community 
means, the presence of a being-together whose immanence is impossible except as its 
death-work. Thus, neither literary art nor communication can answer to the double 
exigency proposed by the phrase “literary communism”. Best articulated, it is which 
would be the sharing of sovereignty as an exposure to the outside, sharing of the 
unworking of the work. Literature as the interruption of myth communicates its 
communion; it is a communication as the passage from one to another, the sharing of 
one by the other. Fictioning is the subject of being and mimesis is the poesis of the 
world as true world of gods, of men and nature. And this is what provokes the 
interruption. Absolute community (myth) is interrupted by literature. 
To write for others means in fact to write because of others. “The writer neither 
gives nor addresses anything to others; he does not envisage his project as one that 
involves communicating something to them, be it a message or himself. Of course, there 
are always messages, and there are always persons, and it is important that both of these 
– if I [Nancy] may for a moment treat them as identical- be communicated. But writing 
is the act that obeys the sole necessity of exposing the limit: not the limit of 
communication, but the limit upon which communication takes place” (original italics, 
my brackets - 67). This common limit is the place where we expose and where it 
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exposes us. What takes place on this limit is the interruption of myth. And moreover, it 
equally requires that the interruption make itself heard with its singular voice. This voice 
is like a cut or the imprint left by the interruption.  
“It is each time the voice of one alone, and to the side, who speaks, who 
recites, who sometimes sings. He speaks of an origin and an end – the 
end of the origin, in truth- he stages them and puts himself on stage along 
with them. But he comes to the edge of the stage, to its outer edge and he 
speaks at the softest limit of his voice. Or rather, it is we who stand at the 
furthermost extreme and who barely hear him from this limit. Everything 
is a matter of one’s practical, ethical, political – and why not add 
spiritual?- positioning around this singular eruption of a voice. You can 
always make a myth out of it again. But this voice, or another, will 
always begin interrupting the myth again – sending us back to the limit” 
(67-8).  
 
Each writer inaugurates a work as community. There is, then, an irrepressible 
literary communism, to which belong anyone who writes or reads by exposing himself 
and not imposing himself. The communism here is inaugural, extended in the singular 
becoming of presence, it is not an end. It is not finished; it is made up of the mythic 
communion and communal myth. This does not mean that it is simply an ‘idea’, either. 
“The communism of being-in-common and of writing (of the writing of being-in-
common) is neither an idea nor an image, neither a message nor a fable, neither a 
foundation nor a fiction. It consists, in its entirety – it is total in this respect, not 
totalitarian- in the inaugural act that each work takes up and that each text retraces: in 
coming to the limit, in letting the limit appear as such, in interrupting the myth” (68). 
The interruption of the myth of the writer is not the disappearance of the writer but the 
death of the last writer. The writer is always there at the moment when the myth is 
interrupted; “he is not the author, nor is he the hero, and perhaps he is no longer what 
has been called the poet or what has been called the thinker; rather, he is this singular 
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voice, this resolutely and irreducibly singular (mortal) voice, in common. In singularity 
takes place the literary experience of writing, of the voice, of a speech given, played, 
sworn, offered, shared, abandoned” (original italics and parenthesis - 70). This singular 
voice of interruption is not a voice without a courage. This courage is not the courage to 
say something dangerous to dare to proclaim.  
“Of course, such courage exists, - but the courage of interruption consists 
rather in daring to be silent, or rather, to put it less summarily, it consists 
in allowing to be said something that no one – no individual, no 
representative – could ever say: a voice that could never be the voice of 
any subject, a speech that could never be the conviction of any 
understanding and that is merely the voice and the thought of community 
in the interruption of myth. At once, an interrupted voice, and the 
voiceless interruption of every general or particular voice” (original 
italics - 80).       
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
 If permitted, a reading of Benjamin’s proposal for a language of sculpture and 
music (“art in the narrow sense”), in other words, a language bereft of the centralization 
of sound, away from the practice of naming with human at the centre of humanization in 
an immaterial community and Adorno’s conclusive attempt at construing such a 
language through rendering them enigmatical in their becoming of transient neglected of 
the moment of both themselves and the artist as the producer behind or differenciation of 
content [into Inhalt and Gehalt] or both Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s attempt of seeing 
the enlightened man caught in the endless repetition, through Deleuze’s definition of 
‘simulacra’, (re-reading difference and repetition), Derrida’s ‘differance’, ‘spacing’, 
‘archi-trace (writing)’ and Nancy’s inept concept ‘being singular-plural’, the ‘co-
presence’ at the very heart of presence, it will be revealed out that Benjamin’s and 
Adorno’s proposals and attempts, inevitably, leak out.  
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 Adorno’s attempt at rendering them enigmatical in becoming transient fail for he 
still places the cosmic time in brackets as a string of internal-time consciousness. From 
Derrida’s point of view, Adorno still can acknowledge with determination what they will 
be when fixed at their limit at the end. The differenciation of content into Inhalt and 
Gehalt also fail due to their surrender of copying the model with the privilege of ‘true’ 
artistic intention.  
If one is allowed to look back at Benjamin’s proposition about the ‘word’ derived 
from God’s word, one will see that he is already taking these in the presupposition of 
either infiniteness or finiteness and still looking for an infiniteness against the 
infiniteness of the supreme word. Or does he not believe that there is an interiority of the 
language that nature can or cannot mourn with or without a language and can this 
differenciation take place without the premier distinction between culture and nature? 
Does this not indicate enough to see that both of them remain to be seen as a captive of 
Western metaphysics?   
One should say then, without any positive investigation here, that the object of 
linguisticity ‘word’ can never be presented in the form of presence neither by any 
concept that partially links to presence. The object of linguistics, ‘word’ disseminates. It 
cannot be differed to be scrutinized for any positive investigation. It is differance and 
‘no concept of metaphysics can capture it’ in Derrida’s words; for any moment of 
capturing it would always drop one into the matrix of structure and the endless 
definitions of antinomies defined according to their varying degrees of a model where 
the second concept is always determined as an image according to the varying degrees 
of lack of the first one; writing defined according its difference from the phoné, the 
nature defined according to the varying degrees from culture, mind/ body, West/East, 
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self/other,  external/internal, image/reality, representation/presence. Any attempt to 
shape or define it, any judgment rendered upon it (as we have seen through Deleuze that 
a judgment would always imply an judger/philosopher who auto-affects himself by the 
approximation to the model) would be tyrannical. The word is not a being or entity in 
mimesis that awaits to be defined but always a co-being (being-with), and the 
philosopher who tries to define and capture it, forgets that the superiority of the presence 
that he enjoys by giving a definition is, in fact, a co-presence at the very heart of 
presence. Words are always already produced in mimesis and do not already present the 
presence of a subject as the translator of full speech (a philosopher or a linguist who can 
‘select’ their appropriation in what approximation to the eidetic model that they yield 
and the degree of their differenciation) and do always already produce meanings. In 
simulacra, doubled onto the immanence of structure/model, they can be repeated without 
difference, without becoming signs. This is what should be understood by the word 
‘dissemination’ here; ‘without the simplicity of origins’. ‘Dissemination’ what Derrida 
has written about elsewhere do not infer the idea of dissemination without the model, but 
already acknowledge that the simulacra is not a mimesis but an addition to mimesis. 
Copies can only be reversed into simulacra. The production between the icon [mimesis] 
and simulacra are not the same, perhaps this is where both Benjamin and Adorno, 
themselves, are enigmatical; they see and in fact, force to render ‘mimesis’ as simulacra 
and bear the epiphenomena as phenomena. As it is very-well known that it is the 
bourgeoisie that has the claim of presenting the ‘original’, which can underline the 
reason of their attack. However, is not presenting another ‘presentation’ against the 
model also situate them in the claim that an ‘simple originarity’ can be proposed (a 
language that is not the language of technicians or artworks becoming transient in 
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enigmaticalness etc.), indeed, without forgetting that they are always already re-
presentations. This proposition, here, inevitably, returns us to the complexity of origins.  
Although remaining with his lines that are depicted in this thesis, Derrida will not 
tell us further about the state ‘without the simplicity of origins’, where this 
dissemination or the being singular-plural depicted by Nancy, can be lingered for 
Deleuze is art. Art is the simulacra, it reverses copies into simulacra.  There are two 
types of games for Deleuze. The first one is the human games which are based on the 
pre-existing moral categorical rules that serve to determine the probabilities but never 
affirm the whole of chance. Every time the dice is thrown, they fragment it with 
sedentary distributions and produce the man as the subject of the game, who has all the 
hypothesis about the Good and Evil so that the game is an apprenticeship in morality. 
This conception of a game, indistinguishable from the practice of representation 
(mimesis), inscribed in the matrix of necessity and essence is completely different from 
what Deleuze calls a divine game.  
“The divine game is quite different – that which Heraclitus, perhaps, 
speaks; that which Mallarmé evokes with such religious fear and 
repentance, and Nietzsche with such decisiveness – for us it is the most 
difficult game to understand, impossible to deal with in the world of 
representation. First, there is no pre-existent rule, since the game includes 
its own rules. As a result, every time, the whole of chance is affirmed in a 
necessarily winning throw. Nothing is exempt from the game […] every 
time, the different throws are distinguished not numerically but formally, 
the different rules being the forms of a single ontologically unique throw 
are same across all occasions.[…] A pure idea of play – in other words, 
of a game which would be nothing else but play instead of being 
fragmented, limited and intercut with the work of men. (What is human 
game closest to this solitary divine game? As Rimbaud said: look for H, 
the work of art.) […] This is the point at which the ultimate origin is 
overturned into an absence of origin […] An aleatory point is displaced 
through all the points on the dice, as though one time for all times. These 
different throws which invent their own rules and compose the unique 
throw with multiple forms are […] so many imperative questions 
subtended by a single response which leaves them open and never close 
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them. […] It is a game on two tables. How could there not be a fracture at 
the limit or along the hinge between the two tables? And how can we 
recognize on the first a substantial I identical to itself, on the second a 
continuous self similar to itself? The identity of the player has 
disappeared, as has the resemblance of the one who pays the price or 
profits from the consequences. The fracture or hinge is the form of the 
empty time, through which pass the throws of the dice. On one side, 
nothing but an I fractured by that empty form. On the other, nothing but a 
passive self always dissolving in that empty form” (Deleuze, Difference 
and Repetition 283-4).   
 
The best time when the immaterial community that Benjamin criticizes is 
interrupted, given by Nancy is when literature emerges. Without a proposal of a different 
language of art, this is what Nancy had proposed by his provisional phrase “literary 
communism”, a community in which we are already living, where the privilege of sound 
working for the sovereignty (of the subject) is always shared.  
Throughout the history of literature, some authors have lived as differance, 
shattering and sharing against the sovereignty as dead-alive, striving between death and 
birth, writing without thinking, marking the dead time in the nonpresence of 
nonconsciousnes. This thesis has just adumbrated the outline of the pathway through 
which these authors can be seen and studied with the prospect of future studies. 
Although the scope of this thesis has not let them be analyzed either I want to indicate 
one of them, William Burroughs and his intention with his cut-up technique. My 
intention, here, is not in any way to venerate Burroughs but to exercise the pathway and 
imply the study upon already existing authors who have already deconstructed the onto-
phenomeno-logical literary theory of metaphysics. William Burroughs’s technique of 
cut-up is the ultimate form where the mentioned divine game is inscribed, treating 
‘words’ as ‘text’ and ‘writing’ (in the Derridain sense), playing with their state of 
mimesis, reversing them into simulacra and co-being, shattering their uniqueness and the 
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judgments rendered upon them, was exactly what Burroughs was doing with his cut-up 
technique. The cut-up technique is a mechanical method of juxtaposition in which 
Burroughs literally cuts up passages of prose by himself and other writers and then 
pastes them back together at random.  
In his own words, Burroughs has explained what he was trying to do in an 
interview:  
“Pages of text are cut and rearranged to form new combinations of word 
and image. In writing my last two novels, Nova Express and The Ticket 
That Exploded, I have used an extension of the cut up method I call “the 
fold in method”. A page of text - my own or some one else's - is folded 
down the middle and placed on another page. The composite text is then 
read across half one text and half the other. The fold in method extends to 
writing the flash back used in films, enabling the writer to move 
backwards and forwards on his time track. For example I take page one 
and fold it into page one hundred, I insert the resulting composite as page 
ten. When the reader reads page ten, he is flashing forwards in time to 
page one hundred and back in time to page one. The deja-vu phenomena 
can so be produced to order. In using the fold in method, I edit, delete and 
rearrange as in any other method of composition. I have frequently had 
the experience of writing some pages of straight narrative text which 
were then folded in with other pages and found that the fold-ins were 
clearer and more comprehensible than the original texts. Perfectly clear 
narrative prose can be produced using the fold in method. Best results are 
usually obtained by placing pages dealing with similar subjects in 
juxtaposition. The cut-up method brings to writers the collage, which has 
been used by painters for seventy years. And used by the moving and still 
camera. In fact all street shots from movie or still cameras are by the 
unpredictable factors of passersby and juxtaposition cut-ups. And 
photographers will tell you that often their best shots are accidents . . . 
writers will tell you the same. The best writings seem to be done almost 
by accident but writers until the cut-up method was made explicit that all 
writing is in fact cut-ups. I had no way to produce the accident of 
spontaneity. You cannot will spontaneity. But you can introduce the 
unpredictable spontaneous factor with a pair of scissors” (1) 
 
 As Burroughs also explains that he uses texts that have similar contents. 
On the level of the Similar, which has an ideal resemblance with the eidetic 
                                                 
1 Lake. The Purple Gillter – William S. Burroughs Cut-ups Page. 2004 
http://www.purpleglitter.com/poesy/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25 
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model, Burroughs re-arranges the texts where he already creates their 
Simulacrum. Only in this communication, the singularity of the beings of the 
texts of different authors are given, without a bond and without communion, 
their originality is shattered, where their singularity is exposed. In this 
communication, where a similar text resembles the other text; where they 
resemble together, there is no originality of the identity of the texts. Burroughs, 
tries to hold a plane where their singularity can be shared. And in this 
spontaneous sharing of the time and space of the texts, without the simplicity of 
origins, the origin is an added “with” onto the limit of the texts. Knowing that 
they are already produced, it is not a speculation to treat the texts in experiment 
as traces; where each and every time their being is turned in the becoming-form.  
Moreover, it is, also, an experience of the alterity of the Other without reserving 
the Other in Burroughs’s own psyche. Burroughs, neither rediscovers the other 
authors alterity in himself and recognizes himself in them, but through this 
experience, in fact, sets his singularity outside himself and infinetly delimits it.   
And this is how he has defined his own method elsewhere:  
“The method is simple. Here is one way to do it. Take a page. Cut down 
the middle. You have four sections: one, two, three, four. Now rearrange 
the sections placing section four with section one and section two with 
section three. And you have a new page. Sometimes it says much the 
same thing. Sometimes something quite different -cutting up political 
speeches is an interesting exercise- in any case you will find that it says 
something and something quite definite. Take any poet or writer you 
fancy. Say poems you have read over many times. Now take the poem 
and type out selected passages. Fill a page with excerpts. Now cut the 
page. You have a new poem. As many poems as you like. As many 
Shakespeare, Rimbaud poems as you like. Tristan Tzara said: “Poetry is 
for everyone”. And Andre Breton called him a cop and expelled him from 
the movement. Say it again: “Poetry is for everyone”. Poetry is a place 
and it is free to all cut up Rimbaud and you are in Rimbaud's place. Here 
is a Rimbaud poem cut up. Cut-ups are for everyone. Anybody can make 
 123
cut-ups. All writing is in fact cut-ups. A collage of words read, heard, 
overheard. What else? Use of scissors renders the process explicit and 
subject to extension and variation. Clear classical prose can be composed 
entirely of rearranged cut-ups. Cutting and rearranging a page of written 
words introduces a new dimension into writing enabling the writer to turn 
images in cinematic variation. Images shift sense under the scissors. 
Smell images to sound and sight to sound and to kinesthetics. This is 
where Rimbaud was going with his color of vowels. And his “systematic 
derangement of the senses”. The place of mescaline hallucination: seeing 
colors tasting, sounds smelling forms” (2)  
 
As he explains, it is also a question of breaching their sovereignty, their origin is 
for and by way of the singular plural of every possible origin of each text and the 
presences of each author. First leaving a track in the first text, overturning their 
secondariness and laying out their supplementarity nature is done so that the 
transcendental text will not resemble the pre-critical one. It can be said that this is what 
Derrida has meant by ‘archi-trace’. Against the literary canon’s sovereignty, Burrough’s 
cut-ups definitely comply with the necessity of the erasure of the 
mimetic/representational stance of writing, which cannot be accepted in the logic of 
identity. In the cut-ups, the originarity of the first text does not disappear, what is shown 
is that their originarity is, in fact, constituted by their nonorigin because the end-product 
is a destroyed originarity, that is, it is never an origin in itself but a simulacra.      
Holding them with the “with” that Nancy has defined was also the fullest 
measure of the incommensurable world. It all the time pluralizes the origin singularly, 
that is why each of the text of Burroughs can be treated as ‘being singular-plural’. 
Burroughs has been living, then, in the literary communism of the world where the last 
author has died and where the word is always and everywhere. Each text in the 
                                                 
2 Lake. The Purple Gillter – William S. Burroughs Cut-ups Page. 2004 
http://www.purpleglitter.com/poesy/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25 
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experiment is authentically original, (including the end-product) where the sharing is 
already the sharing itself as origin; the texts and nothing else. All of them are nothing 
but matter, away from the logos, affirmed without difference and repeated without the 
negation and without the mimetology of the presence of a subject.  
I had given William S. Burroughs as the sole example among other authors that I 
had mentioned. This thesis obviously did no permit me to give a wider analyze neither 
any works of Burroughs nor other writers. I wished to underline their stance against the 
literary canon and the entire onto-phenomenology of Western metaphysics, which 
constructs the immanence of its system according to the approximation of a pre-
supposed nonoriginal model. What at least Burroughs had done was not just a futile act 
of overturning but it definitely was pointing out to the continuity between literature and 
life, which, unless deconstructed, always works for the reduction of the trace for 
purification. I hope that I can develop to study those authors from this pathway that I had 
tried to develop or wish that future studies can be complemented by this study.  
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